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What’s So Special About Patent Law? 
Michael Goodman* 
 
The widespread belief that patent law is special has shaped the de-
velopment of patent law into one of the most specialized areas of the law 
today. The belief in patent law’s exceptionalism manifests itself as two 
related presumptions with respect to the judiciary: first, that generalist 
judges who do not have patent law expertise cannot effectively decide pa-
tent cases, and second, that judges can develop necessary expertise 
through repeated experience with patent cases. Congress showed that it 
acquiesced to both views when it created the Federal Circuit and the Pa-
tent Pilot Program. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has 
reminded us that the judiciary’s difficulty with patent cases is not the 
law, but is instead that patent cases often involve difficult subject mat-
ter, which sometimes requires technical or scientific expertise. While 
Congress’s early attempts to deal with these difficulties focused on courts 
with legal―rather than technical―expertise, the Supreme Court’s recent 
pronouncements suggest that they should have been doing the reverse. 
Moreover, to the extent that it is the underlying technology that makes 
patent cases difficult, that commends the use of an administrative, ra-
ther than a judicial, solution. One potentially viable answer to the judi-
ciary’s problem with patent law has already been partly implemented in 
the form of the recently created Patent Trial and Appeal Board. This 
Article proposes expansion of that solution by making that new entity the 
exclusive forum for deciding issues of patent validity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among legal disciplines, patent law stands a world apart. From 
the lawyers who practice patent law―the “patent people”―to the 
judges who decide patent disputes, patent law is becoming an in-
creasingly specialized field.1 As any patent person will tell you, and 
                                                                                                                            
1 I use the term “patent people” to refer to those attorneys who have earned their 
stripes as patent specialists through the act of having spent a significant amount of time 
practicing patent law, as opposed to “patent attorneys,” a term applicable only to those 
who have passed the patent bar. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO 
PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
1 (2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/OED_GRB.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N6TX-PERX] (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). Professor Rai refers to patent people as “patent 
insiders.” See Arti K. Rai, Competing with the “Patent Court”: A Newly Robust Ecosystem, 
13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 386, 387 (2014). 
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most patent outsiders agree, there is just something 
unique―something special―about patent law. The belief in patent 
law’s exceptionalism manifests itself as two related presumptions 
applicable to the judiciary: first, that generalist judges who do not 
have patent law expertise cannot effectively decide patent cases, 
and second, that judges can develop necessary patent expertise 
through experience with patent law.2 Congress showed that it sub-
scribed to both views when it instituted two judicial experiments: 
first, when it created the Federal Circuit and mandated that almost 
all patent appeals be directed to that entity, and then again when it 
created the Patent Pilot Program, through which certain district 
court judges would be designated to hear more patent cases.3 The 
premises underlying those experiments, and the resulting trend 
toward specialization of patent law, have largely been unchal-
lenged, as even outspoken critics of the specialization of courts 
have generally agreed that in “complex areas” such as patent law, 
it may be useful to have specialized adjudication.4 Recently, how-
ever, both the specialization trend and the assumptions upon which 
it was based have hit a formidable roadblock: the Supreme Court. 
While commentators have described the Federal Circuit as 
“the Supreme Court of patent law,”5 it has lately become clear that 
the Supreme Court very much intends to remain supreme with re-
spect to patent law as much as any legal discipline. Unlike the other 
bodies that deal with patents, the Supreme Court is the one body 
that Congress is unable to specialize, and it remains composed en-
tirely of generalist judges. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is signifi-
cant tension between the highest court and the Federal Circuit. In 
recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly chastised the “pa-
tent court” for its overly specialized treatment of patent law and 
directed that patent law be treated more like other areas of 
law. The message from the highest court is clear: patent law is not 
so special.6 In sending that message, the Court has also sent a 
second, largely unheard missive: in contrast to the widespread view 
                                                                                                                            
2 See infra Part I. 
3 See infra Sections I.A., I.B. 
4 See infra note 38. 
5 See infra Section I.A. 
6 See infra Section II.A. 
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that non-specialist judges cannot effectively conduct patent cases, 
the Court’s view is that patent law expertise is not necessary to ad-
judicate patent appeals.7 Because the Court believes that the law 
applicable to patents requires no special expertise, the Court has no 
reason to defer to the judgment of judges whose claims to patent 
law expertise are based upon repeated exposure to that area of law. 
Accordingly, the modern Court no longer affords deference to the 
Federal Circuit based upon its purported patent law expertise. 
But just because the Supreme Court does not think patent law 
is special does not mean the Court does not think there is some-
thing special about patent cases. At the same time that the Su-
preme Court has decried the attempted specialization of patent 
law, it has lamented its own and other courts’ general inability to 
grasp the nuances of the scientific disciplines that are so often the 
subject matter of patent cases. As many jurists have noted pre-
viously, what is special about patent cases is not the law, but the 
subject matter underlying patent disputes.8 
While there have been many previous proposals to deal with 
the difficult subject matter involved in patent cases, they generally 
run into the same problems the Court has identified with Con-
gress’s previous specialization efforts. Some proposals focus upon 
the development of legal―rather than technical―expertise, there-
by running up against the Court’s recent declarations about the 
lack of need for specialization of that type. Most proposals also in-
volve attempt to specialize the judiciary. As commentators have 
long noted, the creation of specialized courts leads to certain prob-
lems, perhaps inevitably. Accordingly, proposals to specialize the 
patent judiciary suffer from the same concerns applicable to Con-
gress’s efforts to specialize patent law by creating the Federal Cir-
cuit and the Patent Pilot Program. 
This Article explains why any need for specialization related to 
patent cases is best achieved at the administrative level and de-
scribes one viable solution that has already been implemented. Un-
like Congress’s moves to specialize patent law by specializing the 
judiciary, the recent move to specialize patent law by injecting 
                                                                                                                            
7 See infra Section II.B. 
8 See infra Part III. 
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more substantive expertise at the executive agency level will likely 
be unobjectionable to the Court. The creation of the Patent and 
Trademark Appeals Board (“PTAB”) and the decision to shift cer-
tain issues to that forum, is a form of specialization based upon the 
difficult technology underlying patent cases, rather than the law. 
This Article suggests expanding that experiment by making the 
PTAB the exclusive forum for challenging patent validity. Unlike 
Congress’s other specialization efforts, in creating the PTAB, 
Congress has produced a specialized body of administrators who 
understand the science and technological issues that are often so 
difficult for judges to grasp, and has focused that expertise where it 
is most needed: issues of patent validity. 
Part I of this Article reviews the congressional efforts to spe-
cialize the patent judiciary. Part II explores the tension between 
those efforts and the Supreme Court, explains why the Supreme 
Court will not defer to the “Patent Expert” Federal Circuit, and 
addresses the Court’s realization that the difficult portion part of 
patent cases is their underlying science and technology. Part III ex-
plores previous proposals to inject technical expertise into the judi-
ciary, and why such proposals are unlikely to resolve what ails pa-
tent law. Part IV explains why Congress’s creation of the PTAB 
fulfills many of the aspirations of earlier proposals to create an ex-
pert patent court without suffering from the downsides inherent in 
a specialized patent judiciary, and proposes making the PTAB the 
exclusive forum for patent validity disputes. 
I. THE SPECIALIZATION OF THE PATENT JUDICIARY 
Congress’s modern attempts to specialize patent law began, in 
1982, at the appellate level with the creation of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, a single appellate body to consider all 
patent appeals.9 More recently, in 2011, Congress created a Patent 
Pilot Program (“PPP”) to specialize patent adjudication at the trial 
level.10 This Part describes what led to those developments specifi-
                                                                                                                            
9 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) 
10 See Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 
(2011). 
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cally while also considering the benefits and costs of judicial specia-
lization more generally. 
A. The Federal Circuit 
Historically, there was no expectation that judges in any court 
either be specialists in a particular area of law or have any particular 
subject-matter expertise in the areas in which they judge.11 Rather, 
judges in the American system have been selected to be generalists, 
and to sit on generalist courts.12 Instead of requiring any expertise 
among the judiciary, the federal judges on the ninety-eight U.S.  
district courts, the twelve regional courts of appeals, and the Su-
preme Court, were each appointed based largely upon their general 
ability as lawyers, and those courts’ jurisdiction defined by geogra-
phy.13 Those judges were called upon, and assumed to be able, to 
decide any area of law.14 In 1961, Judge Henry Friendly sounded a 
clarion call for change from that status quo, opining: 
[W]hereas it was not unreasonable to expect a judge 
to be truly learned in a body of law that Blackstone 
compressed into 2400 pages, it is altogether absurd 
to expect any single judge to vie with an assemblage 
of law professors in the gamut of subjects, ranging 
from accounting, administrative law and admiralty 
to water rights, wills and world law, that may come 
before his court.15 
                                                                                                                            
11 See Diane P. Wood, Speech, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU. L. 
REV. 1755, 1755–56 (1997). 
12 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Current, Subtle—and Not So Subtle—Rejection of an 
Independent Judiciary, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 639 (2002) (“Judges are generalists who 
deal with a variety of matters and there are very good reasons why they should do so.”); 
see generally Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 
(2008). 
13 See Cheng, supra note 12, at 522. 
14 See John M. Walker, Jr., Comments on Professionalism, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL 
ETHICS 111, 113–14 (1999) (“[J]udges should be generalists. Judges should be able to deal 
with all kinds of cases as we must do under the federal system. We ought to be able to 
handle different cases with equal skill. We ought to have the judgment to discern when 
good arguments are being made and when bad arguments are being made.”). 
15 Henry Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer—Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 220 
(1961). 
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In an attempt to address the problem he identified, academics be-
gan to discuss the costs and benefits of creating specialized 
courts.16 
There are numerous hypothesized benefits of the specialization 
of courts. First, it has been suggested that when a single forum de-
cides all of the cases in a particular area of the law, those decisions 
should become more uniform over time, thus creating stability 
within that area of the law.17 A second, related, benefit of speciali-
zation is increased efficiency. The concept is that by assigning cer-
tain cases to a specialized court, the caseloads for judges on other 
courts who no longer need to consider those cases will be re-
duced.18 The third benefit most often cited by advocates of the cre-
ation of specialized courts is the development of expertise. Suc-
cinctly put, the notion is that judges who sit upon specialized 
courts, and who therefore repeatedly deal in the same area of the 
law, will become more adept at applying that area of the law.19 The 
resulting development of legal expertise, the theory goes, will lead 
to both increased efficiency, reflected as more rapid resolution of 
cases by the judges on that court, as well as increased accuracy of 
the decisions.20 Both the expertise and efficiency benefits of specia-
lization are thought to be especially impactful when the cases con-
sidered by a specialized court are complex or time-consuming.21 
The critics of judicial specialization, often generalist judges, 
have expressed a number of concerns about specialization. Judge 
                                                                                                                            
16 Some particularly pertinent works in the vast literature about the costs and benefits 
of specialization include: Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 
DUKE L.J. 1667 (2009); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. 
REV. 377 (1990); Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745 
(1981); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990). 
17 See Paul Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1447 
(2012) (reviewing the benefits proposed by others). 
18 Baum, supra note 16, at 1675. 
19 Id. at 1676. 
20 Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 1447. Professor Baum describes these benefits as 
“efficiency, expertise, and uniformity.” Baum, supra note 16, at 1675. Professor Dreyfuss 
categorizes the same benefits into “efficiency reasons” and “administrative reasons.” 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989). Regardless of how they are characterized, the posited benefits 
of specialization are largely the same. 
21 Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 1447. 
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Richard Posner warns that specialized courts might not be able to 
attract highly qualified judges, that specialist judges might be sus-
ceptible to capture by the bar that regularly practices before them, 
and that they might be overly sympathetic to the policies furthered 
by the law they administer.22 Specifically addressing the potential 
creation of a court focused upon patent law, Judge Simon Rifkind 
warned that a specialized patent court might lead to tunnel vi-
sion—an inability to see the big picture that results in decisions in 
conflict with the general body of law—a problem that would prove 
to be prophetic.23 
Against this backdrop, and weighing those pros and cons, Con-
gress initiated an experiment with a permanent specialized court at 
the appellate level and created the Federal Circuit.24 By saying that 
the Federal Circuit is a “specialist” or “specialized” court, I mean 
simply that the court’s jurisdiction is limited by subject matter,25 
and that as a result, the court hears a disproportionate number of a 
particular type of case than other courts.26 Federal Circuit Senior 
Judge Jay Plager insists that the Federal Circuit is not a specialist 
court because the judges on the court hear many different types of 
                                                                                                                            
22 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 254 
(1996); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 3. 
23 See Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized 
Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 3 (“Even with the 
best motives, a court’s doctrinal isolation may lead to a body of law out of tune with legal 
developments elsewhere.”); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme 
Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 396–97 (2001); S. Jay Plager, The United States Court of 
Appeals, The Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the 
Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 858–59 (1990) (“The concern is that as the 
range of cases narrows, the opportunities to see the big picture, or even parts of it, may 
narrow as well.”). 
24 See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 3–4 (reviewing the history of the creation of the 
Federal Circuit, including Congress’s motivation to do so and balancing of these 
concerns). The D.C. Circuit is also, in part, a specialized court, as that court decides 
many specialized areas of administrative law that are not decided by the other regional 
courts of appeal. 
25 See Cheng, supra note 12, at 526. 
26 This understanding of the term “specialized” is not new. See, e.g., LeRoy L. Kondo, 
Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through Specialization for Internet Law 
and Other High Technology Cases, UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 n.32 (2002) (“Judges will be 
referred to as ‘specialized’ if they have professional or in depth on-the-bench training in a 
particular subject matter of cases or controversies (e.g., drug court ‘specialist’ judges), 
acquired through significant focused exposure to cases in one area of law.”). 
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cases and not solely patent appeals.27 While it is true that the court 
considers some additional categories of cases, that only means that 
the court is not solely a specialist patent court. There is nothing to 
say that one cannot be a specialist in more than one thing. After all, 
Leonardo de Vinci was a specialist in both sculpture and mechan-
ics. In the sense I mean, the Federal Circuit is a specialist patent 
court as well as a specialist in veterans law, government personnel, 
and federal contract law.28 
Of the subject areas that the Federal Circuit considers, patent 
law was the subject matter Congress had in mind when it conceived 
the court, and the promise that a specialized court would result in 
patent law becoming more uniform was the primary impetus for its 
creation.29 At the time, patent law was suffering from a fragmenta-
tion problem that specialization was thought to rectify.30 Before the 
Federal Circuit’s creation, a different version of patent law applied 
depending upon which circuit a litigant was in, with the result that 
forum shopping was rampant and inventors could not predict 
whether their patents would be enforced or struck down as 
invalid.31 The creation of a single, specialized court was intended to 
stabilize the law and make it uniform across the country.32 As the 
first Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, Howard Markey, ex-
plained: “The challenge to the court and its bar is to create and 
                                                                                                                            
27 See S. Jay Plager, The Price of Popularity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
2007, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 751, 754 (2007); S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking 
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735 
(2007). Judge Plager also notes that a court could be considered specialized if the 
“background and training of the judges who make up the court” were uniform, a 
condition he points out is not met for the Federal Circuit. Plager, supra, at 754. Judge 
Plager is correct that there is nothing specialized about the judges’ backgrounds. See infra 
note 48 and accompanying text. 
28 See Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 1461–62 (describing the other aspects of the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction). 
29 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981) (“[T]he central purpose is to reduce the 
widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the 
administration of patent law.”); see also Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 
F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“It is, therefore, clear that one of the primary objectives 
of our enabling legislation is to bring about uniformity in the area of patent law.”). 
30 See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 6–7. 
31 See id. 
32 See id.; see also Plager, supra note 23, at 854–55 (“The impetus behind the 
establishment of the Federal Circuit was the desire to bring about greater uniformity and 
coherency in federal decisional law in the areas assigned to the court.”). 
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maintain a uniform, reliable, predictable, nationally-applicable body 
of law.”33 
There were also some secondary considerations. For example, 
many have noted that the court was charged with strengthening 
patent law, or at least being sympathetic to the policies underlying 
the patent system.34 In addition, as noted by proponents of specia-
lization, the creation of a single court to consider patent appeals 
would remove any tendency of litigants to forum-shop, a problem 
that was perceived as particularly egregious in patent cases because 
of differences in the law in the different circuits.35 Putting patent 
cases in a separate court would also solve another problem Con-
gress wanted to address. Patent cases were thought to be particu-
larly time-consuming for the regional appellate courts, and Con-
gress was trying to find a way to reduce the caseloads for those 
courts.36 To combat the potential dangers of specialization, espe-
cially the problem of capture by a specialized bar, Congress gave 
the court jurisdiction over a number of other types of subject mat-
ter in addition to patent law.37 While there was not, and indeed still 
                                                                                                                            
33 Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Challenge and 
Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 595 (1985); see also Paul Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a 
Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1798 (2013) (“Congress gave the Federal 
Circuit a clear mandate to bring uniformity to patent law. . . . ”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-
312, at 20–23; S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5–6 (19810). 
34 See, e.g., Paul Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 
350 (2014); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 
1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2224 (2000) (“[T]he creation of the Federal Circuit 
had a clear substantive agenda: to strengthen patents.”). Some see this as a weakness of 
the court. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 
1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
761, 785 (1983) (“Specialists are more likely than generalists to identify with the goals of a 
government program, since the program is the focus of their career. They may therefore 
see their function as one of enforcing the law in a vigorous rather than a tempered fashion. 
In this respect the case for a generalist federal judiciary resembles the case for the jury not 
despite, but because of, its lack of expertness.”). 
35 See Holmes Grp. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 840 (2002) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“At that appellate level, Congress sought to eliminate forum 
shopping and to advance uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal patent 
law.”); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 378. 
36 See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 2. 
37 See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and 
Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for A Specialized Patent 
Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 410 (2011). For a discussion of the other areas 
within the court’s jurisdiction, see generally Gugliuzza, supra note 17. 
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is not, agreement that specialization of courts is ever an ideal ar-
rangement, there is widespread agreement that whatever benefits 
there are to a specialized court are especially pronounced in “com-
plex areas” such as patent law.38 As nearly everyone seems to agree 
that patent cases are both time-consuming and complex, patent law 
was thus considered an appropriate, perhaps even ideal, subject 
matter for an experiment in specialization.39 
Another consideration in the creation of the Federal Circuit, 
and the one in which this Article is most interested, is that Con-
gress believed it was creating a court with particular expertise.40 As 
Judge Markey colorfully suggested to Congress during hearings 
about the creation of the Federal Circuit: “[I]f I am doing brain 
surgery every day, day in and day out, chances are very good that I 
will do your brain surgery much quicker, or a number of them, than 
someone who does brain surgery once every couple of years.”41 
                                                                                                                            
38 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
109, 115 (1997) (“Especially in highly complex areas, a specialized court allows 
recruitment of judges who have specific background in the field and permits individuals 
on the bench to develop expertise.”); Sarang Vijay Damle, Specialize the Judge, Not the 
Court: A Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267 (2005) (“[A] 
specialist judiciary will enhance the quality of decisions, especially in complex areas of the 
law.”); Kesan & Ball, supra note 37, at 401 (“A specialized court that allows judges to 
develop expertise—or judicial human capital—may thus be warranted for some complex 
areas of law.”); Revesz, supra note 16, at 1118 n.32 (“[C]ertain areas are so complex that 
it is inefficient for a generalist judge to learn about them.”). 
39 See Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 28 
(2014) (“With complex scientific concepts and difficult code-like lingo, patent law is a 
territory in which few generalists dare to tread . . . .”); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 
67 (“[B]oth patent law and the facts to which the law applies are technically abstruse.”); 
Sue Ann Ganske, The U.S. Supreme Court Decides Six Patent Cases in 2014, Culminating in 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 183, 201 (2015) 
(describing patent law as a “complex area of law”); Kesan & Ball, supra note 37, at 401 
(“[P]atent cases are generally considered to be complex.”); Darrell Issa, Why I’m Pushing 
for the Patent Pilot Program, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.law360.com/
articles/17234/why-i-m-pushing-for-the-patent-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/5KGE-
CXTG] (“[P]atent law is absolutely one of the most complex areas of law.”). 
40 See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 198 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16 
(describing the court as providing “expertise in highly specialized and technical areas.”) 
(quoting statement of J. Jon O. Newman). 
41 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 42–43 (1981) 
(statement of the Hon. Howard T. Markey, C.J., Court of Customs and Patent Appeals); 
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Specialization of courts is not, of course, the same thing as speciali-
zation of judges, and one can imagine systems of centralized adju-
dication that do not involve specialist judges.42 The doctrinal stabil-
ity and uniformity goals underlying the creation of a specialized 
court could be accomplished by the mere fact that the decisions are 
made by a single group of judges, regardless of whether those 
judges have developed any particular subject-matter expertise. 
Thus, for the Federal Circuit’s patent cases, Judge Friendly’s no-
tion of specialization of labor could be achieved regardless of 
whether the individuals on the court are “patent specialists.” In-
deed, in an early assessment of whether the Federal Circuit 
achieved Congress’s goals, Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss recognized 
that “the benefits of specialization appear to lie primarily in giving 
the court the right mix of cases, not in giving the cases the right 
kind of judges.”43 As Daniel Meador has noted, the primary pur-
pose of the creation of the Federal Circuit was “not to create a 
court of experts or specialists,”44 and as Senior Judge Plager wrote, 
“[I]t does not follow that if a court specializes in one or more areas 
of the law, the judges appointed to the court should be specialists in 
those areas.”45 
Nonetheless, commentators routinely acquiesce in the notion 
that one of the primary benefits of specialization of the Federal 
Circuit is the development of patent expertise in the judges that sit 
upon that court, especially as contrasted with the regional appellate 
courts, which are thought unable to “generate accuracy because no 
single court heard enough patent cases to allow (or motivate) its 
judges to develop the kind of expertise required to develop a so-
phisticated body of law.”46 In 2008, Professor Dreyfuss explicitly 
                                                                                                                            
see also Gugliuzza, supra note 33, at 1836 (“[A]nother reason Congress created the 
Federal Circuit was to provide expert adjudication in complex patent cases.”). 
42 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional 
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603 (1989) (proposing a rotating 
panel concept in which generalist judges would rotate through panels that hear only a 
specific subject matter over time). 
43 Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 24. 
44  Meador, supra note 42, at 611–12. 
45 Plager, supra note 23, at 858. 
46 Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 66; see also Gugliuzza, supra note 33, at 1836 (“[A]nother 
reason Congress created the Federal Circuit was to provide expert adjudication in 
complex patent cases.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. 
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called for the Federal Circuit to “press its position as a tribunal 
with special expertise and to fulfill its role as the near-final authori-
ty in patent matters.”47 It is critical to recognize that the percep-
tion that the Federal Circuit is an expert tribunal derives from the 
notion that the judges develop “expertise” with respect to their 
patent docket only by virtue of having heard and decided a lot of 
patent cases; for the most part, the Federal Circuit judges do not 
have scientific or technical backgrounds.48 Just like when Congress 
created the Federal Circuit, the prevailing notion is that simply 
hearing more of a particular type of case makes a judge an “ex-
pert.”49 In the case of the Federal Circuit, there appears to be a 
virtual consensus among commentators that they are patent ex-
perts by virtue of hearing so many patent cases.50 It is therefore not 
                                                                                                                            
REV. 67 (1995) (advocating the use of specialized courts to consider issues “over which a 
generalist bench is unlikely to achieve sufficient expertise and efficiency under its normal 
caseload”). 
47 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit 
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 823 (2008). 
48 Only seven out of the first thirty-four judges to sit on the Federal Circuit had 
technical backgrounds. See Dunstan H. Barnes, Technically Speaking, Does it Matter? An 
Empirical Study Linking the Federal Circuit Judges’ Technical Backgrounds to How They 
Analyze the Section 112 Enablement and Written Description Requirements, 88 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 971 (2013). Of the most recent appointments since that publication, Judges 
Raymond Chen and Kara Stoll have technical backgrounds, while Judges Richard Taranto 
and Todd Hughes do not, making for a total of nine out of thirty-eight, or less than one-
fourth of the judges who have ever sat upon the Federal Circuit with technical 
backgrounds. See Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts
.gov/judges [https://perma.cc/VK2E-TJT6] (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). Also, contrary 
to persistent misconceptions about the Federal Circuit, it is not the case that only Federal 
Circuit judges with significant patent experience consider patent cases. See, e.g., Ben 
Klemens, The Rise of the Information Processing Patent, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 16 
(2008) (“Only a few judges on the [Federal Circuit] bench hear patent cases, and as is 
natural, most of those are former prominent patent attorneys.”). In fact, all of the court’s 
judges are randomly assigned cases from the court’s docket. 
49 See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 198 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16. 
50 See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1538 (2010) (“Whether or not judges on a specialized court have prior 
experience in the field of their court’s work, they become specialists once they begin their 
judicial service.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing 
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 770 (2004) (“[S]pecialization 
can foster expertise, leading to more accurate and efficient decisionmaking.”) [hereinafter 
Dreyfuss, A Continuing Experiment]; William K. Ford, Judging Expertise in Copyright Law, 
14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2006) (“Specialized courts allow judges to gain experience and 
therefore develop expertise.”); Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS 
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surprising that in Congress’s next step toward specializing patent 
law, Congress specifically moved to specialize not the courts, but 
the judges themselves, this time at the district court level.51 
B. The Patent Pilot Program 
After the Federal Circuit’s creation, commentators began to 
complain about the high rate at which that court was reversing pa-
tent decisions of the federal district courts, particularly reversals of 
the meaning of terms in patent claims, known as claim construc-
tion.52 In a series of studies, researchers had demonstrated persis-
tently high reversal rates of nearly a third of cases.53 To many, that 
reversal rate was unacceptable, and demonstrated a need to fix 
                                                                                                                            
L. REV. 1547, 1549 (2011) (“Because about one-third of the Federal Circuit’s docket is 
comprised of patent-related cases, the judges of the court have developed broad expertise 
in patent law.”); Daniel J. Meador, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: An Appellate Court 
Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
471, 482 (1983) (arguing that specialization “improves decision making because each 
judge can achieve a higher level of expertise on the subjects with which he is regularly 
dealing”); John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in 
Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 766, 788 (2000) (“Clearly, the 
Federal Circuit has developed patent expertise of a higher average level than that 
previously found in the regional circuits, as a result to deciding over 200 patent appeals 
per year.”); Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal Constitutional 
Courts, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 121 (2014) (“[J]udges in those courts are presumably 
experts and can be counted on to apply and develop the law more coherently on a 
particular topic.”). Indeed, the notion that the Federal Circuit judges are experts in 
patent law is so widespread that Professor Bock has described the Federal Circuit as 
suffering from “the curse of expertise.” Jeremy W. Bock, Restructuring the Federal 
Circuit, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 197, 204 (2014). It has also been noted that 
“the court also has a very firm belief in its own expertise.” Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
Abolishing Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 327, 342 (2014) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Abolishing Exclusive 
Jurisdiction]. The court’s view of itself as an expert patent court is well demonstrated by 
Midwest v. Karavan. See Midwest Indus. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 61 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (“[W]e think that as the sole appellate exponent of patent law principles this 
court should play a leading role in fashioning the rules specifying what patent law does 
and does not foreclose by way of other legal remedies.”). 
51 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
52 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases, 12 
FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 32 (2002); see generally J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal 
Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 
108 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing the history of claim construction). 
53 See Anderson & Menell, supra note 52, at 33 (collecting and analyzing the empirical 
studies of claim construction reversal rates). 
2016] WHAT’S SO SPECIAL ABOUT PATENT LAW? 811 
 
what was thought to be a broken system.54 Commentators began to 
question whether the trial court judges, who often do not have 
much experience with patent cases, could successfully perform 
claim construction as they manage the few patent cases assigned to 
them.55 The general view is probably well captured by Professor 
Dreyfuss’s assertion that “[a] trial judge who has never read a 
technical document before is less likely to interpret it correctly, no 
matter how many expert witnesses are called to testify, than an ap-
pellate judge who has extensive experience in dealing with such 
matters.”56 The prevailing dogma was that district court judges 
could not effectively handle patent cases.57 
Among those asserting that district court judges lacked the abil-
ity to decide issues of patent law is former Federal Circuit Judge 
Richard Linn, who proposed, as a solution to district court judges’ 
allegedly poor performance, that the Federal Circuit might sponsor 
“judicial training programs, hosting judicial seminars, or facilitat-
ing the exchange of effective practices in patent cases among trial 
judges.”58 But as some commentators, including then-professor, 
now-Federal Circuit judge, Moore suggested, if patent law exper-
tise is acquired by lots of experience, “it seems unlikely that dis-
trict court judges will have sufficient exposure to patent cases . . . 
to improve at construing patent claim terms.”59 Accordingly, those 
who believe that experience deciding patent cases will improve the 
                                                                                                                            
54 See id. at 33–34 (collecting and describing those viewpoints). But see Jeffrey A. 
Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1038–39 (2007) (asserting that claim construction reversal rates were 
not substantially higher than reversal rates in other complex litigation). 
55 See Moore, supra note 52, at 19 (“[T]he frequency with which the Federal Circuit 
judges are construing claims suggests that these judges are developing expertise at the 
task that will increase their ability to perform it accurately. While individual district court 
judges construe only a handful of patent claim terms, the Federal Circuit judges perform 
this task with great frequency.”). 
56 Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 48. 
57 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 934 (2001); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 
805. 
58 Richard Linn, The Future Role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit Now that It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 737 (2004). 
59 Moore, supra note 52, at 30; see also Pegram, supra note 50, at 788 (“U.S. federal 
district judges on average have insufficient exposure to patent litigation to develop 
expertise in patent law and patent litigation.”). 
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performance of district court judges have generally suggested the 
creation of a specialized patent trial court.60 Advocates of the spe-
cialization of courts have noted that the purported benefits to pa-
tent law resulting from increased expertise at the Federal Circuit 
would be even greater at the trial court level, asserting that 
“[d]espite the creation of a specialized appellate court and the con-
comitant benefits to patent adjudication, there is reason to believe 
that the complexity of patent litigation justifies specialization at the 
trial court level as well.”61 
Responsive to these suggestions and in an effort to increase the 
expertise of the judges who decide patent cases at the trial level, 
Congress created the PPP62 with the express purpose of “the crea-
tion of a patent specialists’ pilot program at the U.S. district court 
level, which is intended to improve the adjudication of patent dis-
putes.”63 As Congressman Darrell Issa―who first proposed the 
PPP―opined, “[N]ot all judges have the interest or expertise to 
handle complex patent litigation.”64 The goal, therefore, is to di-
vert patent cases to those judges who express an interest in patent 
law, in the hopes that those judges will thereby develop patent law 
expertise as a result.65 By adopting the PPP, Congress acquiesced 
in the perceptions that (1) deciding more patent cases will lead to 
patent law expertise, and (2) that expertise will lead to different, 
presumptively better, outcomes.66 
                                                                                                                            
60 See Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial 
Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of 
Professor Moore, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 172 (2009); Moore, supra note 57, 
at 932 (“[A] specialized tribunal would develop expertise in patent law and the resolution 
of patent cases, increasing its accuracy and efficiency at resolving these cases.”); John B. 
Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction 
Concurrent with That of the District Courts?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 67, 71–72 (1995); Arti K. 
Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating 
Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 877, 877 (2002) [hereinafter Rai, Specialized 
Trial Courts]. 
61 Kesan & Ball, supra note 37, at 414; see also Pegram, supra note 50, at 767. 
62 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
63 H.R. REP. NO. 109-673, at 3 (2006). 
64 Issa, supra note 39. 
65 Id. 
66 See Dreyfuss, Abolishing Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 50, at 329 (“[T]he judges 
participating in the [patent pilot] program will likely develop special expertise in local 
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The view that non-specialist judges cannot effectively conduct 
patent cases continues to be widespread. In 2010, Professor Drey-
fuss maintained that the Federal Circuit, due to its having devel-
oped patent law expertise, has a comparative advantage with re-
spect to understanding the facts in patent cases versus both other 
courts of appeals and trial judges.67 With respect to trial judges, she 
asserts that “most trial judges have very little experience in high-
tech cases and some are very uncomfortable with technological 
complexity. But the Federal Circuit does not have that problem.”68 
In another recent article that explores the tension between law and 
science, Peter Lee begins with the premise that generalist judges 
“lack the capacity to administer” patent law.69 That view also ex-
tends to the generalist judges who sit on the Supreme Court. As 
John Golden has opined, comparing the Supreme Court to the 
Federal Circuit: “The Supreme Court lacks such expertise and has 
typically demonstrated little in the way of generalist legal craft that 
can add significant value to the resolution of such substantive ques-
tions.”70 In short, the bulk of the commentary related to patent 
law, mostly written by “patent people,” continues to assert that 
“patent people” make better patent law judges.71 As explored in 
the next Section, the Supreme Court has not taken kindly to that 
viewpoint. 
                                                                                                                            
technologies and gain unique perspectives on the problems these industries encounter.”); 
Adam Shartzer, Patent Litigation 101: Empirical Support for the Patent Pilot Program’s 
Solution to Increase Judicial Experience in Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 194 (2009) 
(“Judges that are more familiar with patent law will theoretically make better decisions 
that hold up on appeal to the Federal Circuit.”); Nancy Olson, Comment, Does Practice 
Make Perfect? An Examination of Congress’s Proposed District Court Patent Pilot Program, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 745, 751, 762–71 (2008); Issa, supra note 39. 
67 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme 
Court and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 797 (2010). 
68 Id. 
69 Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2010) (noting that his 
article “proceeds on the premise that no matter how elegantly policymakers craft patent 
law, if generalist judges lack the capacity to administer it, the patent system cannot fulfill 
its objectives”). 
70 John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for 
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 660 (2009); see also 
Lee, supra note 69, at 73 (“[S]keptics might doubt the technical competence of the 
Supreme Court to fully grapple with patent doctrine.”). 
71 See Golden, supra note 70, at 660. 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S RE-ENTRY INTO PATENT LAW 
After the creation of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court 
largely left that court to its own devices,72 an inattention that led to 
the Federal Circuit being referred to as “the de facto supreme 
court of patents.”73 During the decade from 1992–2002, the Court 
began to hear a few more patent cases, primarily those involving 
“procedural, jurisdictional, and structural issues rather than subs-
tantive patent law.”74 The relationship between the Federal Circuit 
and Supreme Court was such that Mark Janis suggested, “Neither 
the time, temperament, nor resources of the Supreme Court will 
allow for the implementation of an interventionist approach to pa-
tent decision making.”75 John Duffy described the sporadic atten-
tion given by the Supreme Court to patent law during that time pe-
riod as “a sign not of the Federal Circuit’s failure as a specialized 
court, but of its great success.”76 The general view of commenta-
tors at the time is well expressed by LeRoy Kondo, who wrote in 
2002 that “[o]ver the past quarter century, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has implicitly given the Federal Circuit its ‘vote of confi-
dence’ in resolving complex technological issues by rarely granting 
certiorari to hear patent or trademark cases.”77 
Since 2002, the Court has taken a more active interest in patent 
law. No longer focusing solely upon procedural issues, the Court 
began “to dive into the heart of patent law,” as it considered issues 
“related to the core aspects of patent law.”78 The Court’s interest 
in patent law appears to have peaked, so far, during the 2013–2014 
                                                                                                                            
72 See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of 
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 277 (2002) (describing the history of the Supreme 
Court’s review of Federal Circuit decisions). 
73 Janis, supra note 23, at 387. 
74 Lee, supra note 69, at 43; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s 
Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
1, 6 (2003) (“[M]any of the patent cases taken by the Supreme Court are ‘patent cases’ 
only in the sense that they involve a patent; rarely do they involve substantive patent 
law.”). 
75 Janis, supra note 23, at 395. 
76 Duffy, supra note 72, at 284. 
77 Kondo, supra note 26, at 18. 
78 Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1 AKRON 
INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 2, 25 (2007). 
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term, when it issued decisions in six patent cases, the most issued 
in a single term since the creation of the Federal Circuit.79 
This return of the Supreme Court to patent law has garnered 
considerable attention, with few describing the courts’ recent rela-
tionship as cheerfully today as commentators did a decade ago.80 In 
contrast to the Court’s early foray into patent law, the Court’s re-
cent decisions reflect apparent frustration with the Federal Circuit. 
Some have described the Court’s treatment of the Federal Circuit 
as “disdainful,”81 whereas even those more hopeful about the two 
courts’ relationship consider the treatment “somewhat bewilder-
ing.”82 In addition to reviewing an increasing number of patent 
cases, the Court has also nearly consistently reversed the Federal 
Circuit, and has almost always done so unanimously.83 It is fair to 
say that the Supreme Court has recently issued a “startlingly 
strong rebuke of Federal Circuit jurisprudence.”84 
Why the Court has so aggressively stepped in to overturn the 
Federal Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence is the subject of much 
                                                                                                                            
79 See Kevin R. Casey & Kevin B. Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Six-Pack of Cases, 27 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 9, 9 (2015). 
80 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation 
and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 28 (2007); Lucas S. 
Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 419 (2012). 
81  Gretchen S. Sween, Who’s Your Daddy? A Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme 
Court’s Recent Patent Jurisprudence, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 204, 204–05 (2009). 
But see Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 793 (“[H]eightened review should not be taken as a 
criticism of the Federal Circuit.”). 
82 Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 808; see also Plager, supra note 27, at 757 
(“[C]uriously . . . the Supreme Court in several other recent cases has inserted itself into 
the operational aspects of patent law.”). 
83 See Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 792 (noting that the Supreme Court “has reversed, 
vacated, or questioned nearly every” Federal Circuit decision it has reviewed); Gary M. 
Hoffman & Robert L. Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases—
Placing the Recent Scrutiny in Context and Determining If It Will Continue, 20 DEPAUL J. 
ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 227 (2010) (“[N]early every Federal Circuit patent 
case to reach the Supreme Court in the past decade has been reversed or vacated in some 
form.”). 
84 Feldman, supra note 39, at 31. But see Hoffman & Kinder, supra note 83, at 229 
(asserting that the Court’s recent involvement in patent policy is “relatively minor when 
compared to other eras of Supreme Court review”). According to those commentators, in 
the grand scheme of things, the Court’s “true objective may be a slight adjustment by the 
high Court, consistent with and reminiscent of philosophies past.” Hoffman & Kinder, 
supra note 83, at 228. 
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scholarly discussion.85 For some, it looks like the gist of what the 
Court is doing is attempting to reduce patent rights.86 While the 
Federal Circuit is largely seen as being a pro-patentee court, the 
Supreme Court’s involvement has been described as an attempt to 
level the playing field, and especially to combat the perceived prob-
lem created by so-called “patent trolls,” firms that assert patent 
rights but do not produce any goods or services themselves.87 For 
others, the explanation for the Court’s recent foray into patent law 
is that the Court has been “systematically favoring holistic stan-
dards over formalistic, bright-line rules,”88 a shift that has been 
criticized by some,89 and praised by others.90 Yet another interpre-
tation is that the Court’s patent decisions are an admonition of the 
Federal Circuit’s decision-making process generally and “are mes-
sages about coming into the fold of careful and precise legal deci-
sion-making.”91 Thus, one proposed solution to the Federal Cir-
cuit’s Supreme Court dilemma is more careful drafting of its legal 
decisions.92 
While I agree that the Court is admonishing the Federal Cir-
cuit’s decision-making, I believe the explanation for why is more 
                                                                                                                            
85 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 793 (“[O]ne really must wonder about this level 
of activity and whether it is an implicit criticism of the Federal Circuit’s work.”). 
86 See Steve Seidenberg, Reinventing Patent Law, 94-FEB A.B.A. J. 58, 60 (2008); see 
also Lee, supra note 69, at 46 (“[T]he Court’s recent interventions have clearly operated 
to narrow substantive patent rights.”). 
87 See, e.g., Rachel Krevans & Daniel P. Munio, Restoring the Balance: The Supreme 
Court Joins the Patent Reform Movement, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 15 (2008) (“The Supreme 
Court is endeavoring to re-balance a patent system that the Court may regard as too 
favorable to patent applicants and owners.”). 
88 Lee, supra note 69, at 46. Professor Lee’s suggestion that the Court prefers 
standards over rules has been called into question. See Feldman, supra note 39, at 29 
(“[S]uggesting that the current Supreme Court has a preference for balancing tests and 
flexible standards would be somewhat surprising on its face . . . . Nor does the notion of a 
preference for standards over rules fit consistently with decisions over the last few 
years.”). It is also the opposite of Timothy Holbrook’s earlier suggestion that the Court’s 
involvement in patent law in 2000–2002 reflected the Court’s enabling of the Federal 
Circuit’s shift toward bright-line rules. See Holbrook, supra note 74, at 5. 
89 See Holbrook, supra note 74, at 5. 
90 See, e.g., David O. Taylor, Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Patent Law Adjudication: 
Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 427 (2013). 
91 Feldman, supra note 39, at 29. 
92 See Dreyfuss, A Continuing Experiment, supra note 50, at 809 (“[T]he Court does not 
defer because the Federal Circuit’s opinions are not very persuasive.”). 
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substantive than that the Federal Circuit has poorly written deci-
sions. Instead, it appears that the Court is sending two distinct, but 
related, messages: first, that patent law is not that special, and 
second that understanding patent law does not require patent law 
expertise. Because the kind of “expertise” the Federal Circuit 
judges have is simply knowledge of patent law, and the Court does 
not believe that such expertise makes one better able to decide pa-
tent law cases, the Court has concluded that the Federal Circuit is 
owed no special deference on patent law issues. By disagreeing 
with the commentators that only judges with patent experience can 
properly apply patent laws, the Supreme Court has called into 
question one of the reasons Congress created the Federal Circuit 
and the entire reason for the creation of the PPP. 
A. Patent Law Is Not Special 
Over its short history, the Federal Circuit has created various 
special rules applicable to patents based upon the notion that pa-
tent law should somehow be different than other law, thus validat-
ing Judge Rifkind’s prediction that a specialized patent court would 
lead to decisions in conflict with the general body of law.93 The Su-
preme Court’s intervention has resulted in a systematic undoing of 
that jurisprudence, as the Court maintains that the law applicable 
to patents is no different than the law applicable to other topics. 
The first message underlying the Supreme Court’s intervention is 
straightforward: patent law is not that special. 
The Court’s realignment of patent law with the rest of the legal 
world can probably be traced back to procedural decisions the 
Court issued in 1999 and 2002. In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Court 
held that the Federal Circuit must review the Patent and Trade-
mark Office’s (“PTO”) factfinding under the standards set out by 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), just like every other 
agency.94 In so holding, the Court explicitly rejected the argument 
                                                                                                                            
93 See Rifkind, supra note 23, at 425; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 3 (“Even with 
the best motives, a court’s doctrinal isolation may lead to a body of law out of tune with 
legal developments elsewhere.”); Janis, supra note 23, at 396–97. For an interesting 
analysis of how the Federal Circuit’s insularism was a predictable result of its 
specialization, see Alan B. Parker, Examining Distinctive Jurisprudence in the Federal 
Circuit: Consequences of a Specialized Court, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 269 (2009). 
94 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
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that the Federal Circuit’s review of patent law is special, and out-
side the boundary of the generally applicable APA.95 In Holmes 
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., the Court held 
that the Federal Circuit should not have jurisdiction over a case in 
which the complaint does not raise a patent claim, but one is raised 
as a counterclaim.96 To reach that decision, the Court was again 
forced to explicitly deal with the argument that Congress’s inten-
tion to create uniformity within patent law trumps general prin-
ciples of law.97 In holding, instead, that the well-pleaded complaint 
rule applies to control the Federal Circuit just as it does other 
courts, the Court again rejected the notion that the Federal Circuit 
and patent law are special.98 
The Court again undid a Federal Circuit rule based upon the 
notion that patent law is special in its 2006 eBay Inc. v. MercEx-
change, LLC decision.99 Whereas the Federal Circuit had estab-
lished a “general rule”—unique to patent cases—“that a perma-
nent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been 
adjudicated,”100 the Supreme Court held in eBay, instead, that the 
traditional four-factor test for determining whether to issue a per-
manent injunction applies “with equal force to disputes arising un-
der the Patent Act.”101 The next year, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genen-
tech, Inc., the Court struck down the Federal Circuit rule that “a 
patent licensee in good standing cannot establish an Article III case 
or controversy with regard to the patent’s validity, enforceability, 
or scope” as inconsistent with the Court’s jurisprudence concern-
ing application of the Declaratory Judgment Act generally.102 The 
Court completed that re-alignment of patent law with the Declara-
tory Judgment Act in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, 
LLC, when it rejected the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the 
                                                                                                                            
95 See id. at 163. 
96 See Holmes Grp. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
97 See id. at 832. 
98 See id. at 832–33. 
99 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
100 See id. at 393–94 (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
101 Id. at 391. 
102 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 122 (2007). 
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burden of proving infringement is born by a declaratory judgment 
plaintiff, rather than the patentee.103 
The Court next demonstrated that patent law is not special by 
rejecting the Federal Circuit’s exceptional case standards. First, in 
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., the Court re-
jected the Federal Circuit’s standard for determining when a pa-
tent case is exceptional, holding that the standard should be the 
same as it is in copyright cases.104 At the same time, the Court re-
jected the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that entitlement to attorney 
fees must be established by clear and convincing evidence, holding 
instead that, like other “comparable fee-shifting statutes,” the cor-
rect standard is preponderance of the evidence.105 In Highmark Inc. 
v. Allcare Health Management System, the Court completed its re-
versal of the Federal Circuit’s “exceptional case” precedent, hold-
ing that, just like fee-shifting statutes outside the patent context, 
the district court’s exceptional case decisions in the patent context 
must also be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.106 
Similarly, in Commil USA, LLC v. Cicso Systems, Inc., the Court 
drew from contract law, property law, and criminal law to reach its 
conclusion that a belief in a patent’s invalidity is no defense to a 
charge of inducing patent infringement.107 The Court again drew 
on broadly applicable legal principles in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. when it held that the Federal Circuit must re-
view a district court’s claim construction under the clear error 
standard rather than conducting its own analysis de novo.108 The 
explicit basis for that holding is that Rule 52(a)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure applies just as much to fact findings in pa-
tent cases as in any other type of dispute.109 The Court further 
demonstrated that patent law is not as special as the Federal Cir-
cuit seemed to think when reviewing a case out of Texas in Gunn v. 
Minton, when it rejected the reasoning of a line of an entire line of 
                                                                                                                            
103 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014). 
104 See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 
(2014). 
105 See id. at 1758. 
106 See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747–48 (2014). 
107 See Commil USA, LLC v. Cicso Sys. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930–31 (2015). 
108 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
109 See id. at 836. 
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Federal Circuit precedent holding that state law claims alleging le-
gal malpractice in the handling of a patent case must be brought in 
federal court because they raise “a substantial federal issue.”110 
The message from the Court is that patent law is no different 
than other areas of the law. The message, it seems, has started to 
get out, at least to the direct recipients of the Court’s message: the 
Federal Circuit judges themselves. As Judge O’Malley recently 
recognized, the Supreme Court’s message to the Federal Circuit is 
that “as an Article III court, it is bound by the same civil rules, ju-
risdictional standards, and common law principles that govern all 
Article III courts—in other words, that patent litigation must be 
treated like all other litigation.”111 In contrast, the Court’s next 
message, which follows directly from the notion that patent law is 
not special, has not been widely recognized. 
B. The Supreme Court Does Not Defer to Federal Circuit Expertise 
The Supreme Court’s attention to patent law beyond the pro-
cedural and into “the heart of patent law”112 has “caused conster-
nation in patent circles.”113 Professor Dreyfuss captures perfectly 
what appears to be the prevailing sentiment among patent people: 
The judges on the Federal Circuit have built up ex-
perience over their years of service, while the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court do not even have a gene-
ralist’s knowledge of patent law. After all, their own 
experience on lower court benches could not possi-
bly have given them any perspective on patent 
law . . . .114 
To Professor Dreyfuss, the problem is “how the Supreme 
Court can use the generalist knowledge derived from its unique po-
                                                                                                                            
110 See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1063, 1068 (2013) (“Nor can we accept the 
suggestion that the federal courts’ greater familiarity with patent law means that legal 
malpractice cases like this one belong in federal court.”). 
111 See Kathleen M. O’Malley, The Intensifying National Interest in Patent Litigation, 19 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 10 (2015); see also Plager, supra note 27, at 751 (“One type of 
case that draws Supreme Court attention is one in which the Circuit strays from generally 
applicable rules governing litigation in favor of special rules for patent cases.”). 
112 Holbrook, supra note 78, at 25. 
113 Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 807. 
114 Id. at 794. 
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sition in a way that takes account of the Federal Circuit’s expertise 
in technology, patents, and licensing.”115 She has suggested that 
the Supreme Court’s attention is not a criticism of the Federal Cir-
cuit and that the Court must “figure out how a judiciary largely 
committed to generalist adjudication should deal with a court that 
is so differently constituted.”116 Suggesting that it is yet to be de-
termined “under what circumstances a specialized court should be 
able to ‘pull rank’ and claim that its expertise gives it a superior 
perspective,”117 Professor Dreyfuss asserts that “[w]hat the Su-
preme Court has not done . . . is face the larger question of exper-
tise head-on.”118 
I disagree. The Court has addressed the patent law expertise 
question; it has just reached a conclusion that patent people do not 
like. The analysis can be summarized as follows: first, because pa-
tent law is not that difficult or special, understanding and interpret-
ing it does not require any particular legal expertise. Furthermore, 
because interpreting patent law does not require any particular le-
gal expertise, those judges who have become “specialists” by de-
veloping expertise through exposure to patent law should not be 
given special deference as an “expert” court. Accordingly, the le-
gal opinions of the Federal Circuit judges are no longer entitled to 
special treatment or deference as an “expert” court. These mes-
sages from the Court—that patent law does not require legal exper-
tise and that therefore patent law expertise is not entitled to defe-
rence—although intimately related to the first message described 
above, has not yet been digested by the patent community at 
large.119 
                                                                                                                            
115 Id. at 796. 
116 Id. at 794. 
117 Id. at 807. 
118 Id. at 799. 
119 The Federal Circuit judges also appear not to see a pattern in the Court’s 
pronouncements, instead suggesting that it is related to the importance of patent law to 
the nation. See, e.g., Plager, supra note 27, at 757 (“[C]uriously, though in keeping with 
the notion that patent law now plays a major economic role in the nation, the Supreme 
Court in several other recent cases has inserted itself into the operational aspects of 
patent law.”). Still, while patent people generally appear not to appreciate this 
implication of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it is not unappreciated by some 
practitioners. See, e.g., Jeff Bleich & Josh Patashnik, Supreme Court Watch: The Federal 
Circuit Under Fire, S.F. ATT’Y, Fall 2014, at 42 (“Specialists see patent law as a field that 
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As already noted, for many years after the Federal Circuit’s 
creation, the Supreme Court implicitly gave the Federal Circuit its 
“vote of confidence” in resolving patent cases.120 Indeed, during 
that period, the Supreme Court was also known to explicitly de-
scribe the Federal Circuit as specialists in patent law.121 Even while 
the Court required the Federal Circuit to defer more than it had to 
the PTO in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Court also took pains to note 
that the Federal Circuit was itself “a specialized court” that would 
review PTO factfinding “through the lens of patent-related expe-
rience.”122 That perspective was not to last. If the Court’s early 
lack of attention was a vote of confidence, its attentiveness in re-
cent years suggests the opposite. Even had the Court affirmed the 
Federal Circuit in the twenty-five patent cases it has taken in the 
last decade, the excessive attention would still suggest that the 
Court has concerns about permitting the Federal Circuit to be the 
final word on patent law issues. 
The Court laid the foundation for why the “expert” Federal 
Circuit need not be given deference when the modern Court took 
its first substantive look at patent law in 2002 in Festo Corp. v. Sho-
ketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.123 As Professor Duffy docu-
mented, the Supreme Court quickly recognized that “while the 
application of the law to the facts of any particular patent case is 
difficult, the law being applied need not be.”124 Professor Duffy’s 
analysis is spot on and worth repeating: 
For a generalist Court such as the Supreme 
Court, one immediate problem presented by patent 
                                                                                                                            
transcends traditional law; it requires a carefully trained eye, to know what is indeed an 
invention and what is not, and rules that give a heightened degree of protection to 
encourage inventors to keep inventing. Generalists have little sympathy for these 
attitudes. For them, patent cases require no more special knowledge than any other 
difficult and high-stakes area—from antitrust to copyright to employment to consumer 
class actions—where generalist judges are perfectly capable of resolving highly complex 
and nuanced questions of law.”). 
120 Kondo, supra note 26, at 18. 
121 Cf. Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (“[W]e lack the 
benefit of the Federal Circuit’s informed opinion on the complex issue of the degree to 
which the obviousness determination is one of fact.”). 
122 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999). 
123 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
124 Duffy, supra note 72, at 331. 
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cases is that they are likely to involve a great amount 
of technological detail that the Court is ill-suited to 
evaluate . . . .  
. . . . 
The Supreme Court overcame this problem 
with an elegant solution. It simply asserted that “the 
precise details of the [invention’s] operation are not 
essential here.” Here we see a wise precedent for 
the Court’s involvement in patent cases, and per-
haps too in other cases requiring specialized know-
ledge. The insight is that, while the application of 
the law to the facts of any particular patent case is 
difficult, the law being applied need not be. . . . The 
arguments made before the Court—which con-
cerned the unfairness of a retroactive decision, the 
need for stability in property rights, the aspiration 
for precise definitions of property rights, and the 
practical limits of language—do not require any par-
ticular knowledge of technology. A generalist Court 
can comprehend these matters; indeed, it may have 
a broader perspective on them than does a court 
immersed in the details of a specialized field of 
law.125 
The Supreme Court was unanimous in Festo when it concluded 
that the en banc Federal Circuit had “ignored the guidance” of the 
Supreme Court.126 Even though it is itself a generalist court, the 
Supreme Court decided that the Federal Circuit had erred in ap-
plying substantive patent law and that it did not take a patent law 
expert to see it.127 It is notable that the Court has continued to ex-
press near unanimity when overturning the Federal Circuit’s pa-
tent decisions.128 In a time when the Supreme Court is sharply di-
vided in other areas of the law, the fact that the Justices see eye-to-
eye when holding that the Federal Circuit is wrong speaks volumes 
about the Court’s lack of confidence in that court’s expertise. 
                                                                                                                            
125 Id. at 329–32 (internal citations omitted). 
126 See Festo, 535 U.S. at 739. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 725. 
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The Court has continued—and expanded upon—this line of 
thinking from Festo to today. In 2006, the Court granted certiorari 
in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, 
Inc., a case involving 35 U.S.C. § 101, patentable subject matter.129 
While the Court ultimately dismissed the writ as improvidently 
granted, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dis-
sented from the denial and in the process called into question the 
Federal Circuit’s handling of patent law as well as the premise that 
a generalist court could not do as well: “[A] decision from this ge-
neralist Court could contribute to the important ongoing debate, 
among both specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent 
system, as currently administered and enforced, adequately reflects 
the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent laws . . . em-
bod[y].’”130 Those Justices left no doubt that they were affirming 
the position avowed in Festo: that generalists can interpret the pa-
tent laws as well as specialists.131 
Were there any doubt remaining about the Court’s belief that it 
can wade into substantive patent law headfirst, that doubt was dis-
posed of the following year when the Court addressed the law of 
obviousness in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.132 In KSR, the 
Court did not accuse the Federal Circuit of failing to apply general-
ly applicable rules of law to patent law, but instead of failing to un-
derstand patent law itself.133 After explaining that “[t]he flaws in 
the analysis of the Court of Appeals relate for the most part to the 
court’s narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry,”134 the 
Court went on to detail the Federal Circuit’s errors related both to 
how patent examiners should assess obviousness and how a “per-
son of ordinary skill in the art” would solve problems or issues 
fundamental to patent law.135 In stark contrast to the Court’s earli-
er description of the Federal Circuit as having an “informed opi-
                                                                                                                            
129 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125–26 
(2006) (per curiam). 
130 Id. at 138 (alteration in original) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)). 
131 Id. 
132 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007). 
133 See id. at 422. 
134 Id. at 419. 
135 Id. at 418. 
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nion on the complex issue of the degree to which the obviousness 
determination is one of fact,”136 in KSR the Supreme Court gave 
no deference to any purported expertise of the Federal Circuit.137 
Rather, the Court described the Federal Circuit’s analysis as “con-
stricted” and as containing “fundamental misunderstandings,” 
and it did so unanimously.138 
Not satisfied to stop there, the Court also fulfilled the promise 
of the dissenters in Laboratory Corp. by reworking the Federal Cir-
cuit’s understanding of patentable subject matter in a series of re-
cent cases, starting with Bilski v. Kappos in 2010,139 continuing 
through Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc.140 and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc.,141 and culminating in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.142 
In the process, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with the Federal 
Circuit’s care of patent law, going out of its way to declare that 
“nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing interpreta-
tions of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
used in the past.”143 
As the Court has attacked the Federal Circuit’s understanding 
of the fundamental patent law concepts of patent eligibility and ob-
viousness, it should not be surprising that the Court also gave no 
deference to—and chastised the Federal Circuit for its misunders-
tanding of—some other patent law questions. After the Court re-
versed the Federal Circuit’s holding that the patent exhaustion 
doctrine does not apply to method claims in Quanta Computer, Inc. 
v. LG Electronics, Inc.,144 the Court stated in its Limelight Networks, 
Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. decision that “[t]he Federal Cir-
cuit’s analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to in-
fringe a method patent.”145 The Court also rewrote the standard 
                                                                                                                            
136 Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986). 
137 See KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 398. 
138 Id. at 404, 421–22. 
139 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
140 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
141 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
142 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
143 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612. 
144 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
145 Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014). 
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for determining when something is indefinite in Nautilus, Inc. v. 
Biosig Instruments, Inc., after complaining that the Federal Circuit’s 
test had “[f]allen short” of the standard as it was “more amorph-
ous than the statutory definiteness requirement allows.”146 
In general, rather than defer to the Federal Circuit’s views 
“[f]or many substantive issues of patent law . . . the Court has 
dusted off its own venerable case law for guiding principles, largely 
ignoring twenty-five years of more recent Federal Circuit deci-
sions.”147 Indeed, even when affirming the Federal Circuit deci-
sions in Bilski and Global–Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the 
Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s description of the applicable 
law, affirming the conclusions by applying patent law in a very dif-
ferent way than the Federal Circuit had.148 Collectively, these cases 
demonstrate a pattern: the Supreme Court, itself a generalist court, 
has roundly rejected calls for it to defer to the “specialist” Federal 
Circuit. While the general view of patent commentators is that 
“[i]t is an odd moment indeed when the Supreme Court feels 
moved to explain patent infringement to the dedicated patent court 
of appeals,”149 it is not odd at all when one takes the position that 
there is nothing expert about the “specialist” patent appeals court. 
The law applicable to patents, the Court insists, is not just not spe-
cial, it is also not any more difficult than other areas of law. Accor-
dingly, there is no reason generalist judges cannot understand the 
                                                                                                                            
146 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2131 (2014); see id. at 2124 
(“In place of the ‘insolubly ambiguous’ standard, we hold that a patent is invalid for 
indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the 
prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about 
the scope of the invention.”); id. at 2130 (“[A]lthough this Court does not 
‘micromanag[e] the Federal Circuit’s particular word choice’ in applying patent-law 
doctrines, we must ensure that the Federal Circuit’s test is at least ‘probative of the 
essential inquiry.’” (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 
17, 40 (1997))). 
147 Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 30. This is not to say that the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of issues of patent law were necessarily correct or the Federal Circuit’s wrong. 
As Justice Jackson famously said of the Court: “We are not final because we are infallible, 
but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). For purposes of this Article, the important point is that in the 
Court’s view, it is as qualified as the Federal Circuit to consider patent law issues. 
148 See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612; Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 
(2011). 
149 Feldman, supra note 39, at 34. 
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law just as well as specialist judges, and no reason to defer to the 
supposed “expertise” of the Federal Circuit. The Court seems to 
be saying that in its opinion, specialist patent judges—who are 
“specialists” only in the sense that they are intimately familiar 
with the law, as opposed to the underlying facts—are no better at 
deciding patent cases than are generalists, and may be worse.150 
What the Court has done in its recent foray into patent law is to 
proclaim, in strong disagreement with the assertions by patent law 
commentators, that a generalist appellate court can competently 
understand and apply patent law. To the extent that people think 
the Supreme Court itself cannot do patent law, the Court has itself 
forcefully asserted, “Yes, we can.” 
As Professor Golden has aptly noted, “[T]he Circuit hears 
enough patent cases to acquire unquestionable expertise on ques-
tions of substantive patent law.”151 The Supreme Court does not 
appear to believe the Federal Circuit’s “expertise” in patent law 
should be deferred to, however.152 It appears, instead, that the Su-
preme Court is suggesting that courts who are experts only in the 
sense that they are specialists in some area of law are not owed de-
ference based upon that expertise. This view is supported by a re-
cent realization that “these trends are occurring across the entirety 
of the Federal Circuit’s decisions, and not just with regards to pa-
                                                                                                                            
150 At least one of the Justices appear to be of the view, shared by some commentators, 
that the biggest beneficiary of the notion that patent law requires special patent law 
expertise is the patent bar. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–42, KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007) (“[The TSM test] produces more patents, which 
is what the patent bar gets paid for, to acquire patents, not to get patent applications 
denied but to get them granted. And the more you narrow the obviousness standard to 
these three imponderable nouns, the more likely it is that the patent will be granted.”); see 
also Gugliuzza, supra note 33, at 1855 (“[T]his empirical evidence suggests that the 
creation of the Federal Circuit has increased patent activity generally without unduly 
favoring either patent holders or accused infringers—an outcome that would seem to 
please patent lawyers of all stripes.”). 
151 Golden, supra note 70, at 660; see also Pegram, supra note 50, at 788 (“Clearly, the 
Federal Circuit has developed patent expertise of a higher average level than that 
previously found in the regional circuits, as a result to deciding over 200 patent appeals 
per year.”). 
152 The Court’s practice is also inconsistent with the suggestion that the circuits should 
defer to the expert Federal Circuit. See Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of 
Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the 
Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 564–68 (2004). 
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tent questions.”153 The Court thus appears to have taken one small 
step toward joining those who doubt the specialization of judges 
helps judges reach better decisions.154 
Jonas Anderson has suggested that the Supreme Court’s in-
volvement in patent law is in reality the Court starting a dialogue 
with Congress, using the Federal Circuit as an intermediary.155 If 
this is a dialogue with Congress, it may be a shot across the bow 
against the use of specialized courts. If so, Congress does not seem 
to have gotten the message. After the Court held that the regional 
courts of appeals could decide certain patent law issues in Vorna-
do,156 Congress responded by strengthening the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over patents.157 On the other hand, in re-
sponse to criticism about the Federal Circuit’s exclusivity in 
another area of its jurisprudence, Congress took a step toward dis-
mantling the specialized court regime by undoing the Federal Cir-
cuit’s longstanding exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the 
Whistleblower Protection Act.158 Still, regardless of whether the 
Court’s pronouncement extends beyond patent law and the Feder-
al Circuit, at least in this one area, the Court has decided that a 
specialist court is owed no more deference than a generalist one.159 
                                                                                                                            
153 Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Relationship with the 
Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 275 (2012); see also Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1211–12 (2011) (describing an increase in the 
Court’s attention to the Federal Circuit’s veteran law jurisprudence). 
154 See Ford, supra note 50, at 49 (“[T]his study suggests that specialization does not 
improve copyright decisions.”); see also POSNER, supra note 22, at 254 (“In most areas of 
federal law at present, there cannot be any assurance that a specialized court, merely by 
virtue of specializing, would produce better decisions.”); Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, 
Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 850 (2012) (“[I]t is unlikely to be 
the case that the content of specialists’ decisions will differ in some qualitative respect 
from—or be in some general sense ‘better than’—those of their generalist 
counterparts.”). 
155 J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (2014). 
156 See Holmes Grp. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
157 See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 19(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
158 See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
159 See Anderson, supra note 155, at 1097. 
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C. Implications for the Specialized Patent Judiciary 
Neither the realization that the law applicable to patents is not 
special, nor the recognition that the Court does not defer to the 
Federal Circuit, necessarily translates into a recommendation to 
undo Congress’s experiments with specialization in this area or 
endorsement of proposals to direct patent appeals back to the re-
gional courts of appeal, where they were once decided. While the 
Court has, I think correctly, called into question the notion that 
patent law expertise is necessary to decide patent cases, it is ulti-
mately an empirical question whether such experience makes any 
difference: one that the PPP will help assess. What the Court’s fo-
ray into patent law teaches at least is that there are serious ques-
tions whether to continue to specialize the judiciary based upon 
expertise in patent law until there is reason to believe that doing so 
will help. 
With respect to the Federal Circuit, it is important to recall that 
it was created for reasons other than developing patent law exper-
tise in the judges who hear patent appeals.160 Congress was also— 
and even more—interested in uniformity and efficiency, both goals 
that are not undermined by the Court’s apparent view that patent 
law expertise is not a necessary precondition to deciding patent law 
cases.161 The Court’s view that patent law is not exceptional there-
fore has only limited implication for the future of specialization of 
the patent-focused judiciary. Still, policy-makers would be wise to 
consider the possibility that the Court is correct that increased le-
gal expertise is not the solution to the judiciary’s patent dilemma, 
as they consider structural changes to improve the resolution of 
patent cases. 
III. WHAT MAKES SOME PATENT CASES DIFFICULT IS 
THE TECHNOLOGY 
A. The Technology in Patent Cases Is Often Difficult 
Even while the Court has suggested that generalist judges can 
apply patent law, the Court has not been sanguine about those 
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judges’ ability to decide patent cases as a whole. Instead, the Court 
has revealed that whereas it believes that patent law is comprehens-
ible by a generalist judiciary, the court recognizes that the facts in 
patent cases are another issue entirely. As Judge Rifkind noted in 
1951, that is where patent law gets difficult, because it is not the law 
that makes patent cases complex, it is the technology.162 The mod-
ern Court discovered that fact for itself when it began to regularly 
delve into patent cases. In Mayo,163 the Court was forced to consid-
er a case that demanded involvement not only with patent law but 
also with the scientific facts to which the law was to be applied.164 
Again, the Court gave the Federal Circuit no deference, instead 
unanimously reversing the Federal Circuit after conducting its own 
analysis of whether the claimed use of thiopurine drugs in the 
treatment of autoimmune diseases was a patentable process or an 
impermissible attempt to claim a fundamental law of nature.165 But 
even while doing so the Court conceded, “Courts and judges are 
not institutionally well suited to making the kinds of judgments 
needed to distinguish among different laws of nature.”166 To con-
duct its analysis, the Court relied upon amici it described as medi-
cal experts, including the American Medical Association, the 
American College of Medical Genetics, the American Hospital As-
sociation, the American Society of Human Genetics, the Associa-
tion of American Medical Colleges, and the Association for Mole-
cular Pathology.167 
The Court was again forced to delve into scientific questions it 
was not well suited to deal with the following year when assessing 
the patentability of DNA and cDNA in Myriad.168 Justice Scalia’s 
notable concurrence sums up nicely the concerns of many jurists 
when dealing with such questions: 
                                                                                                                            
162 See Rifkind, supra note 23, at 425; see also Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 60, 
at 878 (“[T]he complexity of patent law lies not in its legal principles but in the scientific 
fact-finding required to apply those legal principles properly.”). 
163 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
164 As the Court stated, it turned to its precedents only to “reinforce[] our conclusion.” 
Id. at 1302. 
165 See id. at 1289. 
166 Id. at 1303. 
167 See id. 
168 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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I join the judgment of the Court, and all of its 
opinion except Part I–A and some portions of the 
rest of the opinion going into fine details of molecu-
lar biology. I am unable to affirm those details on my 
own knowledge or even my own belief. It suffices for 
me to affirm, having studied the opinions below and 
the expert briefs presented here, that the portion of 
DNA isolated from its natural state sought to be pa-
tented is identical to that portion of the DNA in its 
natural state; and that complementary DNA 
(cDNA) is a synthetic creation not normally present 
in nature.169 
Through that admission, Justice Scalia joined a long list of emi-
nent jurists who have recognized their own lack of real subject mat-
ter expertise to address the complex scientific and technological 
questions that sometimes underlie patent cases and have ques-
tioned the wisdom of having those questions decided by judges.170 
As Felix Frankfurter observed, “It is an old observation that the 
training of Anglo-American judges ill fits them to discharge the du-
ties cast upon them by patent legislation.”171 That sentiment was 
echoed by Learned Hand, who asked: “How long we shall continue 
to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative 
scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows; 
but all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits 
of mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some such ad-
vance.”172 Judge Friendly, whose clarion call for change led to the 
use of specialized courts said that patent cases go “beyond the abil-
ity of the usual judge to understand without the expenditure of an 
inordinate amount of educational effort . . . and, in many instances, 
even with it.”173 While those eminent jurists have been described 
as “express[ing] skepticism about the ability of generalist judges to 
understand patent disputes,”174 it is fairer to say that the judges 
                                                                                                                            
169 Id. at 2020 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
170 See infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text. 
171 Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60–61 (1943). 
172 Parke–Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
173 HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 156–57 (1973); see 
generally Friendly, supra note 15. 
174 Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 1448. 
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were expressing skepticism about the ability of judges to under-
stand patent disputes, whether they are generalists or specialists. 
The concern is not that judges don’t know enough law; it is that 
they don’t know enough science and have difficulty applying the 
law to difficult facts. 
B. The Federal Circuit Cannot Be Patent Fact-finders 
One potential resolution to this problem is for the Court to be-
gin to defer more to the Federal Circuit with respect to the tech-
nologies underlying patent disputes. In harmony with Professor 
Dreyfuss’ suggestion that “the Federal Circuit’s unique responsi-
bility toward patent law argues for a broader scope of review over 
fact finding,” the court could simply choose to defer to that spe-
cialist court.175 Congress included no special deference mechanism 
when it created the Federal Circuit, however, and the Court has 
not chosen to create one. Instead, just as the Court has thus re-
fused to defer to the Federal Circuit’s expertise over the law appli-
cable to patents, so too the Court has found that the Federal Cir-
cuit has no special claim to development of the facts. Instead, the 
Court has held that the fact-finders, both the PTO and district 
court judges, are better equipped than the Federal Circuit to apply 
that law to the facts of individual cases.176 The Court first did so in 
1999, when it held that the Federal Circuit’s review of PTO deci-
sions should be under the more deferential APA standard rather 
than the one the Federal Circuit had been applying.177 More recent-
ly, in a pair of 2014 cases, Highmark and Octane Fitness, the Court 
required the Federal Circuit to defer more to the district court de-
cisions about whether a case is exceptional.178 The next year, in Te-
va, the Court overturned decades of Federal Circuit precedent to 
limit the Federal Circuit’s review of district courts’ claim con-
struction decisions.179 
                                                                                                                            
175 Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 61–62. 
176 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
177 See id. 
178 See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Octane 
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
179 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 (2015). 
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When it comes to questions of fact, the Court has insisted that 
if any judge must attempt to resolve difficult technological or scien-
tific factual questions, it is better that it be trial judges rather than 
appellate judges. While the Court does not appear to believe in the 
development of expertise when it comes to an area of the law, the 
Court appears to believe that whatever understanding of the par-
ticular scientific issue a district court is able to acquire while deal-
ing with the case is at least better than appellate courts are able to 
manage. As the Court said in Teva: 
We have previously pointed out that clear error re-
view is “particularly” important where patent law is 
at issue because patent law is “a field where so 
much depends upon familiarity with specific scien-
tific problems and principles not usually contained 
in the general storehouse of knowledge and expe-
rience.” A district court judge who has presided 
over, and listened to, the entirety of a proceeding 
has a comparatively greater opportunity to gain that 
familiarity than an appeals court judge who must 
read a written transcript or perhaps just those por-
tions to which the parties have referred.180 
While the Supreme Court has resolved that the Federal Circuit 
(as well as the Court itself) should avoid dealing with the facts un-
derlying patent disputes as much as possible and focus on getting 
the law right, that solution is unavailable to the district courts.181 As 
fact-finders, district court judges are required to delve into the 
facts of many patent disputes.182 Accordingly, as best it can within 
the current framework, the Court appears to be shifting patent fact 
related issues to the court better able to discover such facts. The 
Court seems to appreciate that getting the facts of a patent case 
right requires more, not less, understanding of the technology in-
volved. While the Federal Circuit has at times asserted an outsize 
role in fact-finding in patent cases, and has been encouraged to do 
                                                                                                                            
180 Id. at 838 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 
610 (1950)). 
181 See id. at 837. 
182 See Lee, supra note 69, at 77. 
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so by commentators who view that court as an expert tribunal,183 
the Supreme Court has roundly rejected each of the Federal Cir-
cuit’s attempts to “bring its expertise to bear on the facts that af-
fect the outcome of technologically complex cases.”184 Instead, the 
Court has shifted those factual issues back to district court judges. 
In doing so, the Court does not seem, however, to be giving its 
stamp of approval to programs, like the PPP, that aim to develop 
patent law expertise in district court judges. If the Federal Circuit 
judges are not given deference based upon their very extensive pa-
tent law experience, it would be odd indeed to defer to district 
court judges who have far less patent law experience on that same 
basis. The Court has decided that district courts should have a 
greater role in developing the facts of patent law cases not because 
the district court judges have patent law experience but because 
they have the time, and the ability to employ experts, to try to un-
derstand the science at issue in that particular case.185 As Professor 
Lee has noted, the Court’s recent decisions “reflect a sentiment 
that enhancing accuracy may go hand-in-hand with requiring 
courts to engage more fully with technological context.”186 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court appears to be unwilling to defer 
to lower court judges on issues of patent law (including either the 
Federal Circuit or PPP judges) if the specialization reflects only the 
development of legal expertise, rather than specialization that in 
some way will help those judges to better understand the facts in 
patent law cases.187 Because solely having patent law expertise will 
not enable judges to decide patent cases any better than generalists, 
there is no reason to try to develop that expertise in judges. 
C. Judiciary-Based Solutions Are Unlikely to Resolve the Problem 
The judiciary’s problem with patent law, in a nutshell, is that 
patent fact-finding appears likely to benefit from scientific and 
                                                                                                                            
183 See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 61–62. 
184 Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 798. 
185 See Lee, supra note 69, at 12. 
186 Id. at 46. 
187 The Court’s logic is also inconsistent with other proposals to increase the patent 
experience of judges as a way to increase their “expertise” in dealing with patent cases. 
See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 50, at 788 (“[A]n expected greater volume of patent 
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technical expertise but judges, both at the district court and appel-
late level, currently lack that expertise.188 Having concluded that 
the technology is, if anything, what may be special about patent 
law, the question becomes how to better deal with those difficult 
facts. Despite persistent misconceptions to the contrary, the major-
ity of the judges on the Federal Circuit do not have technical back-
grounds, and an even smaller proportion of district court judges 
have science or engineering expertise.189 As this Article has de-
tailed, Congress’s attempts to specialize the judiciary, both 
through the creation of the Federal Circuit and the PPP, are not 
effective solutions to this problem because legal expertise is not 
what is needed in patent law, a fact to which the Supreme Court 
has recently called attention.190 
Various additional proposals have been offered to increase the 
expertise of the courts dealing with patent cases. Perhaps the most 
straightforward are proposals simply to appoint more scientists and 
people with technological expertise to the judiciary. Scott Brewer 
proposed to have scientifically or technically trained judges decide 
cases at the trial level where scientific or technical facts are at is-
sue.191 Similarly, Professor Kondo suggested that “[t]he Federal 
Circuit, or a division of it, might further evolve to become more 
specialized in fact in the future through court appointments, ap-
proximating a science or patent court.”192 Indeed, multiple re-
searchers have proposed the creation of a patent court at the trial 
                                                                                                                            
188 See Kondo, supra note 26, at 7 (“Federal judges and juries, with the notable 
exception of the Federal Circuit, generally lack the scientific expertise arguably necessary 
to comprehend and decide highly technical intellectual property cases.”). In fact, the 
Federal Circuit is no exception. As Professor Kondo acknowledges, only a few Federal 
Circuit judges have a technical or scientific background. Id. at 6. Professor Kondo’s 
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expertise. 
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190 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 (2015). 
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YALE L.J. 1535, 1681 (1998). 
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level, both with and without judges who have technical expertise.193 
Commentators who lament the high district court claim construc-
tion reversal rate have frequently hypothesized that judges with 
scientific training may be better at claim construction.194 Others 
have proposed increasing the training of judges generally, such that 
they are prepared for a patent case when one is assigned.195 
The problems with each of those proposals largely mirror the 
problems applicable to Congress’s previous efforts to specialize the 
judiciary. Each of the concerns that were expressed when Congress 
created the Federal Circuit are just as applicable to efforts to create 
a specialized patent court, including the concerns that the court 
will become too insular, will develop tunnel vision, will be too pro-
patent, and will be subject to capture.196 In addition, the Supreme 
Court may be wary of those proposals for the same reasons it ap-
pears not to have embraced Congress’s patent law specialization 
efforts. The proposal for directly appointing more technically-
trained judges to the Federal Circuit, for example, does not take 
advantage of the understanding that it is patent fact-finding (as op-
                                                                                                                            
193 See Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 60, at 896; Gregory J. Wallace, Note, 
Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases After Festo and Markman: A 
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law clerks with such expertise is also a central tenet of the PPP. See Issa, supra note 39 
(“Each of the test courts will be assigned a clerk with expertise in patent law or the 
scientific issues arising in patent cases . . . .”). 
196 See supra Section I.A. 
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posed to patent law) that requires subject-matter expertise.197 It 
also fails to account for the Supreme Court’s recent pronounce-
ments that the Federal Circuit, as an appellate court, is not in a po-
sition to delve into the facts as much as that court has been 
doing.198 In light of that recent jurisprudence limiting the ability of 
the Federal Circuit to delve into the technological underpinnings of 
patent cases, it seems there is little that a group of scientists on the 
Federal Circuit could realistically do to improve the adjudication of 
patent disputes. 
Another reason that simply creating an appellate court made up 
of scientists may not be sufficient to resolve the problem was well 
described by Judge Rifkind. As he noted, “It is hardly to be sup-
posed that the members of a patent court will be so omniscient as 
to possess specialized skill in chemistry, in electronics, mechanics 
and in vast fields of discovery as yet uncharted.”199 That realization 
is as true of the Federal Circuit as it is a hypothetical patent court, 
and a concern with the majority of the proposals to inject more ex-
pertise into the judiciary. Professor Arti Rai appropriately criticized 
Professor Brewer’s suggestion “because expertise in one area of 
science or technology does not transfer over to other areas,” it 
“would require selecting a group of judges that was trained in a 
large variety of different areas of science and technology.”200 Pro-
fessor Rai also criticized the Federal Circuit on that basis.201 Her 
proposal to create a specialized trial court is not, however, immune 
from that same problem, as she proposes that the judges on a spe-
cialized patent trial court would have only a minimal level of fami-
liarity with scientific principles rather than subject-matter expertise 
pertinent to the technology being considered.202 Such a proposal 
seems insufficient in light of a recent study providing preliminary 
evidence supporting the view that the particular type of scientific 
or technical expertise that a Federal Circuit judge enjoys makes a 
difference in how that particular judge decides patent cases in that 
field. As the study’s author notes, “expertise in one technical field 
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does not connote expertise in all technical fields.”203 Ultimately, 
proposals to create a patent court made up of judges who do not 
have scientific or technical expertise rely upon the notion that the 
judges will develop expertise through repeated exposure to patent 
cases. As this article suggests, however, expertise in patent law 
may not be what is needed in patent cases. 
Jeanne Fromer suggests that geography might solve the exper-
tise problem, as different technologies are over-represented in dif-
ferent parts of the country.204 She hypothesizes that if venue rules 
were changed to require patent litigation to stay close to home, it 
will result in repeated judicial exposure to the same type of tech-
nology, which will improve a judge’s ability to consider patent cas-
es dealing with that technology.205 Unfortunately, that proposal 
depends upon the as yet unproven theory that judges can develop 
sufficient scientific or technical expertise through repeated expo-
sure to cases involving a particular type of technology, rather than 
through formal technical education.206 While that may be true, it 
does not bode well for the litigants whose cases are the ones in 
which the judge is learning the technology. Moreover, as Judge 
Friendly lamented, many patent cases are often beyond the ability 
of a judge to understand even after the judge has devoted “the ex-
penditure of an inordinate amount of educational effort.”207 The 
concern about the amount of training that it may take to educate a 
judge about the science underlying a particular patent case raises 
what may be an intractable problem with each of the proposals to 
inject expertise into patent cases by increasing the scientific acu-
men of the judiciary. At the end of the day, judges are not scien-
tists, and perhaps we don’t want them to be. Perhaps we want 
them to focus their efforts instead toward being experts in judging. 
Ultimately, judges are already specialists, and their field is the 
law. In his excellent article written shortly after the creation of the 
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Federal Circuit, Judge Richard Posner identifies the fact that in the 
traditional American system “[o]ur judges are specialized―to 
judging.”208 In a footnote he continues: “And, it goes without say-
ing, to the law.”209 I am not so sure it should go without saying. 
Perhaps it is better to explicitly proclaim that judges are specialists 
in the law if only to acknowledge that there is such a specialty. It 
seems likely that for one to truly become a “specialist” in the law, 
it helps if one is a generalist with respect to the facts to which that 
law is to be applied. In other words, it may be that judges can be 
better judges if we do not ask them also to be specialists in some 
other skill, or some other area of inquiry. It hardly seems that we 
will get those individuals who have best learned the specialty of 
judging if we are also asking them to become experts in biochemi-
stry or particle physics. 
The Supreme Court appears to be sympathetic to such notions. 
As this Article has demonstrated, in recent years the Court has de-
emphasized the importance of specializing in patent law while also 
recognizing that judges are ill-equipped to address scientific ques-
tions.210 Combining those teachings does not suggest that judges 
should learn more science, but that they should focus upon their 
judicial role. As at least some justices have directly cautioned, 
judges should not aspire to become “amateur scientists.”211 An 
additional concern with judges being asked to develop technical 
expertise is that it may not be good policy to give experts, or judges 
turned experts, the last word on scientific or technical issues, as 
experts are invariably partisan. As Professsor Rai has aptly noted, 
“In areas of heated scientific controversy, all individuals who are 
sufficiently knowledgeable to qualify as experts may have already 
committed themselves to one or the other side of a dispute.”212 Es-
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pecially in patent law, which by definition involves new and nonob-
vious discoveries,213 it may be particularly important to ensure that 
someone who is blessedly unbiased about the underlying science or 
technology will serve as the final authority about those issues. The 
judiciary is comprised of exactly those people, experts at judging 
who are often ignorant of the more subtle nuances of various areas 
of science. 
Perhaps sensitive to these concerns, some researchers have 
proposed solutions that do not directly involve the Article III judi-
ciary. For example, Edward DiLello has proposed the creation of 
permanent expert magistrate judges,214 while Eric Cheng has pro-
posed shifting more patent cases to the International Trade Com-
mission (“ITC”).215 While those proposals avoid some of the prob-
lems associated with an expert judiciary, they may ultimately prove 
to be unworkable because they are too difficult to implement or in-
volve too great a departure from the status quo for Congress to se-
riously consider making the necessary changes. Both proposals suf-
fer from the same problem as the proposal to create a patent trial 
court. As Professor Rai noted, to solve that particular problem 
would require “a trial court with at least as many specialties and 
subspecialties as the Patent and Trademark Office.”216 To solve 
the expertise problem with magistrate judges would also require 
the appointment of magistrates with different specialties in each 
district, as the type of expertise one magistrate judge has may not 
be transferable to different cases outside that magistrate’s exper-
tise. Professor Rai lamented that “the likelihood of assembling a 
group of judges competent not only in law but in all of the various 
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fields of scientific and technical endeavor relevant to the patent 
system is low.”217 
Another solution, outside the judiciary has also been discussed. 
Professor Dreyfuss considered the problem not only by analogy to 
the PTO, but having the PTO itself provide the necessary expertise 
to the patent system.218 She recognized that “administrative fact-
finding might be preferable to specialized trials,” and that “the 
scope of re-examination could be expanded to allow the PTO to 
reinvestigate whether a patent was properly issued.”219 She did not 
believe, however, that the PTO was up to the task.220 But while it 
may have been a low probability, Congress has crafted a solution 
that takes advantage of many of the strengths of these proposals by 
creating the new PTAB within the PTO. As the next Part explores, 
that entity avoids many of the pitfalls of prior proposals for dealing 
with the difficulties of patent cases. 
IV. THE PTAB: A SOLUTION INVOLVING SPECIALIZED 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE 
When Congress most recently reformed the patent system, 
through passage of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), it continued 
the movement toward specialization of patent law that began with 
the creation of the Federal Circuit.221 The newest effort is unlike 
the previous reforms, however, as in the AIA, Congress did not 
attempt to specialize the courts or rely solely upon the notion that 
legal expertise is developed through experience.222 Instead, this 
newest specialization effort responds well to the reality that the dif-
ficult portion of a patent case is the technology, and finds the ne-
cessary expertise to deal with that technology in a judge’s formal 
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education.223 Rather than specialize the judiciary, Congress’s most 
recent specialization to patent law resulted in more patent disputes 
being shifted to an entity within the executive branch with real sub-
ject-matter expertise, the PTAB.224 
A. Specialized Expertise to Address Complex Technology 
The PTAB is currently composed of approximately 230 Ad-
ministrative Patent Judges (“APJ”) appointed by the Secretary of 
Commerce.225 Unlike most judges in the federal judiciary, each of 
those APJs has technical or scientific backgrounds as well as a law 
degree. Moreover, each of the APJs is hired to handle trials involv-
ing a particular type of technology. The qualifications for one re-
cent job posting for a PTAB-APJ, stated that to be considered for 
the position applicants must possess, in addition to a law degree 
and experience with patent law, “a bachelor’s or higher degree in 
the study of engineering, chemistry, or biology” or “[a] thorough 
knowledge of the physical and mathematical sciences underlying 
professional engineering” and “[a] good understanding, both theo-
retical and practical, of the engineering sciences and techniques 
and their application to professional engineering.”226 Whereas 
creating “a trial court with at least as many specialties and subspe-
cialties as the Patent and Trademark Office”227 may have been im-
possible within the judiciary, that is precisely what Congress 
created in the PTAB within the PTO itself. Accordingly, when an 
issue is considered by the PTAB, the people discussing the issue on 
both sides of the bench are likely to have some expertise in the 
technology at issue as well as familiarity with the patent laws. 
                                                                                                                            
223 See supra Part III. 
224 See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012). Formally, the PTAB is a redesignation of the old Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”), albeit with greatly expanded 
responsibilities. 
225 JAMES DONALD SMITH & SCOTT R. BOALICK, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD UPDATE 29 (May 14, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/20150514_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KEA6-SZNT]. 
226 Administrative Patent Judge Job Posting, USAJOBS, https://www.usajobs.gov/
GetJob/ViewDetails/406508200 [https://perma.cc/YPU4-2LCB] (last visited Mar. 6, 
2016). 
227 Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 60, at 894. 
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While the notion of the development of technical expertise is 
fairly new to the judiciary, the PTO has long held the view that 
technical knowledge is necessary to apply patent law to new tech-
nologies. Therefore, only registered patent attorneys or agents may 
practice before the PTO.228 To become a registered patent attorney 
or agent, one must both have a particular technical or scientific 
background as well as pass the “Patent Bar,” the PTO’s “registra-
tion examination.”229 For its part, the PTO also requires that pa-
tent examiners have some specialized technical expertise.230 Unlike 
the historically generalist court system, the internal workings of the 
PTO are highly specialized with examiners working within a par-
ticular “art unit.” Those distinctive aspects of the PTO are all 
maintained for the PTAB. 
The use of the PTAB to resolve patent issues therefore com-
ports with commentators’ views that patent cases may benefit from 
increased specialization. Because Congress’s effort has resulted in 
the appointment of subject-matter experts as patent judges, it ful-
fills the goals of commentators who proposed solutions such as the 
creation of a patent court.231 While the use of technically expert 
judges is yet a further specialization of patent law, it is quite differ-
ent from the specialization of the courts and judges that Congress 
previously attempted, as it is not an effort to make the law special 
or to create legal expertise through experience, but rather, it is a 
reaction to the reality that dealing with cutting edge technology is 
what is special about patent cases. Thus, the PTAB also avoids 
many of the objections to Congress’s earlier specialization efforts 
detailed above. The use of an executive agency, rather than the ju-
diciary, to apply patent laws to the technically difficult subject mat-
ter of patents addresses many of the concerns of commentators and 
the Supreme Court. By making an executive agency fulfill that role, 
the courts remain free to complete the role the Supreme Court en-
visions, that of unbiased non-experts in technical matters. 
The PTAB does not address all of the issues involving technol-
ogy that may arise in patent cases, however. Instead Congress li-
                                                                                                                            
228 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.5–.9 (2012). 
229 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
230 See id. § 11.7(a). 
231 See supra Section I.A. 
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mited its role to one of addressing issues of a patent’s validity. The 
first major role played by the PTAB is to serve as an appellate 
body, giving patent applicants an opportunity to obtain a second 
opinion from the PTO about a patent examiner’s decision to deny a 
patent application. The PTAB’s other major role is to conduct ad-
judications and issue decisions in two types of proceedings created 
by the AIA: Post-Grant Review (“PGR”) and Inter Partes Review 
(“IPR”).232 The PGR procedure allows someone other than the 
patent owner to challenge the validity of a patent within nine 
months after the patent has been issued.233 The IPR procedure is 
similar except that the person challenging the patent as invalid may 
only file the challenge after a PGR has been completed or the time 
period for filing a PGR has elapsed.234 The issues the administra-
tive law judges who make up the PTAB may consider are also dif-
ferent between the two proceedings. During a PGR, the PTAB may 
invalidate a patent based upon any ground that could be raised dur-
ing a patent infringement trial, whereas during an IPR a patent can 
be invalidated only if it is not novel, is obvious, or both.235 Those 
post-grant proceedings are adversarial in nature, and much like a 
district court trial, involve discovery and oral argument. They dif-
fer from district court trial proceedings, however, in that PTAB 
decisions are made by a panel of three judges, as opposed to the 
district court model, which involves a single judge. Importantly, 
decisions of the PTAB as to a patent’s validity have preclusive ef-
fect on the party that raises a post-grant challenge, as the petitioner 
is subject to estoppel in district court. Specifically, once the PTAB 
issues a final written decision, the petitioner may not assert in any 
civil action “that the claim is invalid on any ground that the peti-
tioner raised or reasonably could have raised during” the proceed-
                                                                                                                            
232 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b), 311–29 (2012). The PTAB is also responsible for conducting 
proceedings specifically related to challenges to “covered business methods,” a provision 
scheduled to expire in 2020. See Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329–30 (2011). 
233 See 35 U.S.C. § 321. 
234 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(c). 
235 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (referencing 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) and (3)), with 35 
U.S.C. § 311(b). The standards are also different, as PGR’s are initiated if the PTAB finds 
that it is “[m]ore likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is 
unpatentable,” whereas an IPR will be permitted if the PTAB finds a “reasonable 
likelihood that the petition will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged 
in the petition.” Compare 35 U.S.C. § 324, with 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
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ing.236 The PTAB’s decision does not, however, estop parties who 
are not party to the PTAB proceeding. The PTAB also does not 
address issues of infringement, which continue to be addressed by 
district court judges and juries. 
B. A Proposal to Expand the Role of the PTAB 
By creating the PTAB, and implementing an administrative 
system to allow for post-grant review of patents, Congress has 
achieved multiple benefits that commentators previously touted 
from such a procedure, including cost savings and increased effi-
ciency versus district court proceedings.237 One very tangible dif-
ference is that by statute, PTAB must resolve disputes significantly 
faster than the normal time it takes to complete district court pro-
ceedings.238 In addition, as this Article describes, the PTAB adds a 
level of expertise that is often absent from district courts proceed-
ings.239 Indeed, the potential benefits of expert agency adjudication 
of patent law issues are so great, that one might think that it makes 
sense to ask the executive to decide all issues in patent cases; both 
validity and infringement, and to exclude the courts entirely. Un-
der current law, district court judges continue to decide, in addi-
tion to questions of infringement, whether a patent is valid in the 
first place.240 A district court is called upon to evaluate patent va-
lidity both when a validity defense is raised in a patent infringement 
suit as well as when an unsuccessful patent applicant sues the PTO 
in district court directly to obtain a patent.241 In either procedural 
posture, a district judge must decide patent validity questions that, 
as this Article has outlined, the PTAB may be in a better position 
to address.242 As a result, there are inefficiencies in the current sys-
tem, not the least of which is that litigants prepare for the in-
fringement portion of litigation even while the validity of a patent is 
                                                                                                                            
236 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 325(e) (post-grant review). 
237 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What The 
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 270 (2007). 
238 See Karen A. Lorang, The Unintended Consequences of Post-Grant Review of Patents, 17 
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 22 (2013) (describing the increased efficiency and reduced costs 
associated with the PTAB versus the district courts). 
239 See id. at 24. 
240 See 35 U.S.C. § 145. 
241 See id. 
242 See supra Section IV.A. 
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uncertain. Against this backdrop, it is worth considering whether 
some expansion of the PTAB’s role is advisable. Ultimately, I do 
not advocate quite such an extreme proposal as removing all patent 
cases from district courts. In my estimation, the PTO could not be 
authorized to decide cases of alleged patent infringement. On the 
other hand, expanding the role of the PTAB to address all validity 
issues—while removing those issues from the courts—is a path 
forward that has substantial advantages. 
Rather than employing the PTAB’s expertise to resolve only 
some portion of validity disputes, one possible solution to the cur-
rent problem of forcing unequipped district courts to decide patent 
validity issues is to employ the PTAB’s expertise in all circums-
tances in which patent validity questions arise. Under current law, 
the PTAB is merely an alternative forum for deciding questions of 
patent validity.243 My solution would involve making the PTAB the 
exclusive forum for raising those questions. Under my proposed 
structure, the PTAB would address validity questions not only 
when a party seeks to invoke that forum, but also whenever a pa-
tent is asserted in any civil suit and a defendant questions its validi-
ty. That could be accomplished either by instituting a system by 
which district court judges refer validity questions to the PTAB or 
by requiring a party to raise validity challenges at the PTAB shortly 
after an infringement suit is filed. Under this proposal, the courts 
therefore would deal only with issues of infringement.244 
The reason it is possible to shift only determinations of a pa-
tent’s validity to the PTAB, as opposed to questions of whether a 
patent is infringed, is because of the fundamental difference be-
tween questions of infringement and validity. As the Supreme 
Court long ago held, patent infringement is a tort.245 Like other 
torts, patent infringement involves a civil suit, which, accordingly, 
must be decided by Article III courts with access to a jury under the 
                                                                                                                            
243 See 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). 
244 This proposal would be a case of convergent evolution, as in the German patent 
system issues of validity are determined by technical courts whereas issues of 
infringement are handled by generalists. See M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent 
Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 334 (2006). 
245 See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 169 (1894). 
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Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.246 The same is not true 
of questions about a patent’s validity. Rather, the issue of a pa-
tent’s validity is an issue between the federal government and the 
potential patentee, and as such it is a public right.247 When the fed-
eral government grants a patent, the government grants “a bundle 
of rights,” including the right to exclude others from using the 
claimed invention.248 Congress grants that monopoly pursuant to 
its constitutional authority under the Patent Clause.249 Because the 
patent rights are created by Congress, they fall within the “public 
rights” exception to Article III of the Constitution.250 They may 
therefore be decided outside the judicial context.251 In other words, 
they may be decided outside of the courts created under Article III 
of the Constitution, and without a jury.252 
Of course, just because it is constitutionally permissible to 
transfer authority for deciding patent validity questions from the 
courts to an administrative entity does not mean that course of ac-
tion should necessarily be followed. Still, there is reason to think 
that doing so might be an improvement upon the status quo. Al-
though under this proposal, patent infringement determinations 
would still be made by district courts, assigning validity determina-
                                                                                                                            
246 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376–77 (1996); see also 
Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 795 (2001) (“[W]hy do U.S. courts allow juries to decide 
patent cases? Because the U.S. Constitution, in its Bill of Rights, requires it.”). 
247 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
248 See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
249 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
250 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n.5 (1964) (“Patent rights 
exist only by virtue of statute.”); Michael P. Goodman, Taking Back Takings Claims: Why 
Congress Giving Just Compensation Jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims Is 
Unconstitutional, 60 VILL. L. REV. 83, 98–101 (2015) (describing the public rights category 
as one of the exceptions to Article III). 
251 See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 
U.S. 442, 455 (1977) (“[W]hen Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may 
assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be 
incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment’s injunction that jury trial is to 
be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common law.’ . . . This is the case even if the Seventh 
Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned 
instead to a federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.”). 
252 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2612–13 (2011); see also Mark A. Lemley, Why 
Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1722 (2013). 
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tions exclusively to the PTAB effectively fills a gap in the courts’ 
ability to decide some of the most difficult issues in patent cases.253 
The Supreme Court has most lamented the judiciary’s lack of ex-
pertise not in dealing with whether a patent is infringed, but in de-
ciding whether it is valid. From the Court’s perspective, “it is of-
ten more difficult to determine whether a patent is valid than 
whether it has been infringed.”254 Accordingly, permitting the ex-
ecutive PTAB to decide validity issues has the benefit of removing 
from the judiciary to the executive only the type of work that most 
likely requires subject matter expertise. By limiting the PTAB’s 
jurisdiction to issues of patent validity, Congress has already suc-
cessfully thread the needle to account for the apparent need for 
more subject-matter expertise in dealing with patents while also 
maintaining the generalist ideals of the judiciary by separating the 
most difficult of the technological questions from the judges. 
There are a number of reasons why making the PTAB the ex-
clusive forum for addressing patent validity makes sense. As Pro-
fessor Stuart Benjamin and Professor Rai, among others, have ex-
plained, the cost and efficiency benefits that are achieved by a sys-
tem of post-grant review are maximized when trial court litigation 
on patents that survive examination is minimized.255 As those pro-
fessors also note, however, when that result is achieved through 
estoppel-based approaches, like those applicable to PTAB proceed-
ings under the current framework, there is a disincentive for some-
one to challenge the validity of a patent at the PTAB.256 If that chal-
lenge is unsuccessful, that party, and only that party, is barred from 
raising validity challenges in an infringement case.257 In addition, 
that procedure is inefficient because the unsuccessful challenge 
that resulted in a finding of patent validity only prevents another 
validity challenge by the same party, but does not prevent future 
challenges in district court by other parties.258 Professors Benjamin 
and Rai suggest that these inefficiencies can be mitigated by requir-
                                                                                                                            
253 See supra Section IV.A. 
254 Commil USA, LLC v. Cicso Sys. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015) (quoting Cardinal 
Chem. Co. v Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 99 (1993)). 
255 See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 323. 
256 See id. at 324. 
257 See id. 
258 See id.; see also supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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ing courts to give strong Chevron deference to the agency’s post-
grant validity determinations.259 As they note, the effect of that in-
creased deference would be that all parties potentially affected by a 
patent would feel the effects of the PTAB’s decisions, “that all po-
tential infringers would have an incentive to help the administra-
tive opponent” and that the deference would “presumably lead to 
diminished litigation over these patents.”260 Those beneficial ef-
fects would be amplified if the PTAB were the exclusive forum for 
raising validity questions. All potential infringers have an even 
stronger incentive to intervene at the PTAB. In addition, rather 
than only a presumption of reduced litigation, there would neces-
sarily be a reduction. From a district court’s perspective, the effect 
of making the PTAB the exclusive forum for challenging patent 
validity is that the current statutory mandate to presume the validi-
ty of the patents at issue would change from a presumption to an 
absolute rule. Before a district court spent valuable time deciding 
whether a patent was infringed, the patent’s claims would have al-
ready been judged to be valid, as the PTAB’s determination of va-
lidity, after any associated appeal to the Federal Circuit or Su-
preme Court, would be the final say on the matter.261 While a party 
that is not estopped by a validity decision of the PTAB could, of 
course, ask the PTAB to again consider that patent’s validity, be-
cause those proceedings are cheaper and faster than district court 
proceedings, even duplicative challenges at the PTAB would be 
more efficient than the current system.262 
Another benefit of PTAB adjudication is that when its deci-
sions are reviewed, including by the Supreme Court, the decisions 
are likely to, and should, be afforded considerable deference. While 
commentators have recognized that the courts historically lack de-
                                                                                                                            
259 See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 326–27. They are joined in this proscription 
by multiple commentators. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent 
Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 50 (2007) (“[D]ecisions made as part 
of that more intense review should be accorded deference by later decision-makers.”); 
Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 266 (2015) 
(“[C]ourts can—and should—follow the practice of finding the PTO’s and ITC’s 
determinations persuasive, even if not technically binding.”). 
260 Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 326–27. 
261 See 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012). 
262 See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 325. 
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ference to the PTO, that fact has largely been attributed to the per-
ceived lack of patent experience, technical expertise, or time that 
patent examiners can apply to reviewing applications.263 The pa-
tent examiners were thought to make errors because of a perceived 
asymmetry between the knowledge of the patent examiner and the 
patent applicant.264 The same criticisms do not appear to have been 
lodged against the PTAB, and likely will not be, at least to the same 
extent. Far from the “abbreviated proceedings”265 that take place 
during patent examination, the PTAB conducts trial-type proceed-
ings before it issues decisions.266 The PTAB also sits in three-judge 
panels in an effort to maintain a high quality of decisions. Finally, 
as commentators have noted when surveying the qualifications of 
the ALJs generally “the USPTO is delivering on its goal of recruit-
ing administrative patent judges with strong technical backgrounds 
and extensive experience practicing patent law.”267 Accordingly, 
within the current or expanded framework, the PTAB’s decisions 
about a patent’s validity should garner substantial deference in the 
courts. 
With respect to the Supreme Court, patent people have been 
very vocal that the Supreme Court’s involvement in patent law is 
not helping. As Judge Dyk has related: “At any gathering of the 
[patent] bar, no tag line of a speech has more assurance of applause 
than one that importunes the Supreme Court to keep its hands off 
                                                                                                                            
263 See Joshua L. Sohn, Can’t the PTO Get a Little Respect?, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1603, 1631 (2011) (collecting and describing criticisms of the PTO). 
264 See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 66–67; see also Sean B. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 101, 114–38 (2016). 
265 Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 146 (2000); see also Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the 
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001). 
266 For a detailed description of PTAB procedures, see Eric C. Cohen, A Primer on Inter 
Partes Review, Covered Business Method Review, and Post-Grant Review Before the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 10 (2014). 
267 JENNIFER R. BUSH, FENWICK & WEST LLP, ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES: NOT 
YOUR TYPICAL FEDERAL JUDGE 2 (2014), https://www.fenwick.com/Fenwick
Documents/Administrative_Patent_Judges.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAX8-UPD7] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2016); see also Michael Wagner, An Introduction to Administrative Patent 
Judges at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 62 FED. LAW., May 2015, at 36 (“With this 
broad amount of experience, the PTAB provides a well-rounded perspective and 
expertise in the area of patent law.”). 
2016] WHAT’S SO SPECIAL ABOUT PATENT LAW? 851 
 
the patent law.”268 If, as some have proposed, the Supreme Court 
is likely “to bungle the law in a highly technical field such as patent 
law” then shifting more of the work related to patents to the PTAB 
may achieve the desirable outcome of increased “neglect by the 
Court.”269 The Supreme Court is likely to defer to the PTAB’s fac-
tual judgment in a way it has not been willing to defer to the Feder-
al Circuit’s legal judgment. While district courts and the Federal 
Circuit have generally not afforded the PTO deference in the past, 
the Court has expressed a willingness to respect and defer to the 
judgment of the PTO that it has not shown subsidiary courts.270 
The Court has also recently referred to the PTO as “an expert 
agency” with “special expertise in evaluating patent applica-
tions.”271 
In that way, the PTO, and the PTAB, is no different from the 
various other administrative agencies whose expertise is given sub-
stantial deference by the courts. Just as Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) decisions about acceptable pollutant levels are 
reviewable by courts only to ensure that those decisions are not ar-
bitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion—the APA’s stan-
dard272—the PTO’s decisions about a patent’s validity should be 
afforded great deference upon review. Indeed, while this discussion 
has assumed that the Court is correct that there is something spe-
cial about the subject matter underlying patent cases, that may be 
true only because patent disputes are one of the few categories of 
cases in which courts are required to do a more searching review of 
agency fact finding than that required by the APA.273 Indeed, the 
science or technology involved in EPA decisions is often just as dif-
ficult to grasp as in patent cases. In actual fact, there may be noth-
                                                                                                                            
268 Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 763 
(2008); see also Gene Quinn, Naked Emperors: A Supreme Court Patent Tale, 
IPWATCHDOG (May 31, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/05/31/naked-
emperors-a-supreme-court-patent-tale/id=58110/ [https://perma.cc/4TUC-BAUN] 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (“The idea that the Supreme Court is at all capable of 
understanding—let alone deciding—issues of a technical nature is ridiculous.”). 
269 Duffy, supra note 72, at 276. 
270 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
271 Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 
2238, 2252 (2011). 
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ing special about patent cases except that courts have heretofore 
been given an overly large role in resolving them. Shifting some of 
this burden to the executive may lead to the realization that there 
really isn’t anything special about patent cases. 
Perhaps the most important benefit of having an executive enti-
ty decide questions of validity, while the courts continue to decide 
questions of patent infringement, derives from the unique status 
patent validity questions have in our society. As previously noted, 
unlike disputes about whether a patent has been infringed, patent 
validity issues involve public rights.274 That means that unlike 
questions involving infringement, a validity challenge is a com-
plaint about government conduct. Whereas questions of infringe-
ment are private disputes that are largely irrelevant to most Ameri-
cans, issues related to a patent’s validity are question of concern to 
many, and are properly thought of as public, rather than private, 
law.275 Because a patent grant is a monopoly issued from the gov-
ernment, a patent’s validity raises issues of public policy and is of 
legitimate interest to members of the public, including many who 
may be uninvolved in any particular infringement suit. In the litiga-
tion context, those members of the public can rarely, if ever, have 
their voices heard. Still, the importance of patent validity issues has 
increasingly resulted in special interest groups trying to get more 
involved. Indeed, along with the Supreme Court’s interest in pa-
tent law, special interest groups and the public at large have increa-
singly been interested in patent law because of the importance of 
the grant of a patent to society and not only to the litigating parties. 
In Myriad, for example, forty-nine different groups filed amicus 
briefs to express their views about the patentability of DNA, in-
cluding the American Medical Association and the AARP,276 and 
an incredible sixty-six amicus briefs were filed in Bilski.277 Because 
anyone who is not the owner of the patent may challenge a patent’s 
                                                                                                                            
274 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
275 See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 41–42 
(2012). 
276 See Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, 
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277 See Bilski v. Kappos, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/
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validity at the PTAB, special interest groups are now able to get 
involved in a more significant way than they could before passage 
of the AIA.278 And that is a good thing. The involvement by such 
groups will likely have the effect of ensuring that the PTAB is res-
ponsive to the policies underlying the patent laws, in a way that 
courts, including the Federal Circuit, were not, and could not be.279 
While “allowing parties who would not satisfy federal standing re-
quirements to challenge a patent’s validity and raise novel and un-
settled legal questions through the post-grant review process” has 
been described as an “unintended consequence” of the AIA, it 
provides an important opportunity to involve the public in those 
issues of patent law that affect the public generally.280 Whereas it is 
inappropriate for courts to decide individual disputes about in-
fringement based upon issues of public policy, administrative agen-
cies are specifically tasked with the role of accounting for public 
policy as they fill gaps in legislation.281 It is therefore altogether ap-
propriate that issues of validity be decided by the PTO’s PTAB. 
CONCLUSION 
The law applicable to patent cases is not especially difficult. Ra-
ther, the technology underlying patent cases is often what gives the 
judiciary trouble. Accordingly, Congress’s efforts to develop spe-
cialized legal expertise in the judiciary may have been misguided. A 
better solution to deal with what ails the judiciary about patent dis-
putes is to focus expertise toward addressing the underlying tech-
nology. Congress’s latest experiment in specializing the patent bo-
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dies, the creation of the PTAB, employs specialization at the ad-
ministrative, rather than the judicial, level and appears to be a via-
ble solution to the judiciary’s problem with patent cases. By giving 
that agency jurisdiction to decide some of the thorniest issues in 
patent cases, questions about patent validity, Congress has made 
real progress in this area. The PTAB experiment does not yet go 
far enough, however. To more fully capture the benefit of adminis-
trative expertise, Congress should consider expanding the PTAB’s 
jurisdiction to make it the exclusive forum for challenging the va-
lidity of issued patents. 
